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Appendix A

Aviation-Ground Task Forces

This appendix contains sections that focus on the aviation brigade's planning and operations when controlling ground maneuver units as part of a task force.

A-1. OVERVIEW

a.

The aviation brigade—

(1)

Is normally is the controlling headquarters for divisional or corps aviation units.

(2)

In this capacity, has limited ground maneuver capability.

(3)

Concentrates almost exclusively on air maneuver and ground-delivered logistics with the exception of the ground troops assigned to the cavalry squadron.

b.

The aviation brigade headquarters—

(1)

Commands and controls aviation units throughout the battlespace.

(2)

Has the capability to command and control (C2) attached units and those under its operational control (OPCON).

(3)

Must prepare to receive ground maneuver forces—including companies and battalions—when an aviation brigade is employed as a task force (TF) headquarters.

(4)

Must integrate these forces—which include light and/or mechanized units—into their scheme of maneuver.

c.

The employment of ground forces by the aviation brigade headquarters can provide the force commander with an integrated air-ground capability. Normally, the heavy battalion TF is employed under a parent heavy brigade in terrain suitable for mechanized maneuver. However, mechanized units are restricted when they encounter urban areas, dense forests, or rugged terrain. In these environments, it may be tactically advantageous to attach these forces to the aviation brigade headquarters.. This allows the forces to capitalize on the superior reconnaissance and direct fire capability of the aviation brigade's helicopters.

A-2. OPERATIONS

a.

The two offensive operations normally conducted by the aviation brigade with attached ground maneuver forces are attack and movement to contact. The primary use of a ground unit attached or OPCONed to the aviation brigade will be as a maneuver force to meet the division or TF commander's intent in these two operations. The attached infantry or armor battalion normally will use one of four methods of maneuver when operating with the aviation force. These include—

(1)

The aviation force attacks by fire while the ground force infiltrates and assaults the objective. This maneuver includes air assault.

(2)

The aviation force attacks by fire while the ground force advances for the assault.

(3)

The aviation force and ground force approach the objective on different axes.

(4)

The aviation force and ground force advance together.

b.

Besides maneuver, the ground force—attached or OPCONed to the aviation brigade—can assist in defensive operations controlled by the aviation brigade. These operations may include—

(1) Area defense.

An example of an area defense is the defense of the aviation brigade assembly area. This type of defense is most likely during periods of intensive maintenance when aviation soldiers are focused on repairing helicopters for an upcoming mission. Units normally conduct an area defense when—

- Directed to defend specified terrain.
- The enemy enjoys a mobility advantage over the defending force.
- Well-defined avenues of approach exist.
- The defending force has sufficient combat power to cover the likely enemy avenues of approach in sector.

(2) Mobile defense. The mobile defense orients on the defeat or destruction of the enemy force; it allows the enemy to advance to a point where it is exposed to a decisive attack by a striking force. A commander organizes his unit into two forces: the fixing force and the striking force. An example of a mobile defense is the use of a mechanized battalion task force attached to the aviation brigade as a fixing force; it canalizes the enemy. The aviation force would be the striking force; it provides lethal fires to destroy the enemy force.

SECTION I. General Task Force Planning Factors

This section discusses initial planning considerations for the general task force. The aviation brigade commander and staff must know, and constantly focus on, the attached unit's doctrine, characteristics, battlefield focus, capabilities, and limitations. Mutual planning, development of orders, rehearsals, and coordination between respective commanders and staffs must take place to capitalize on advantages and offset weaknesses.

A-3. BATTLE COMMAND

For combat service support (CSS) reasons, OPCON is the proper command relationship when a mechanized battalion is subordinate to an aviation brigade for 3 days or longer. Logistics for light units is easier for the aviation brigade to supply—particularly for classes III and V. However, 3 days is still valid for planning. For missions of shorter duration, attachment may be appropriate whether dealing with a mechanized or light force.

a.

Collocate the attached unit's main command post (CP) with the aviation brigade tactical operations center (TOC) when feasible. As a minimum, exchange permanent liaison officers.

b.

Jointly conduct the planning process.

c.

Coordinate the development of orders and overlays.

d.

Exchange codes, recognition signals, and signal operation instructions (SOIs).

e.

Provide a retransmission site, if required, to maintain voice radio contact with the ground unit.

f.

Conduct radio rehearsals early to ensure nets are functioning properly.

g.

Use the ground force's guides when moving vehicles through areas controlled by the ground forces (their assembly area).

A-4. MANEUVER

a.

Ensure that the attached unit is assigned terrain, commensurate with its capabilities, within the aviation brigade's area.

b.

When planning any operation involving linkup with an aviation force, time the operation to avoid leaving the ground force in a vulnerable position. Always consider the mobility disparity between aviation and ground units.

c.

Direct and indirect fires from both units should be mutually supporting. The aviation brigade may employ its attack helicopter battalion by using its long-range direct fires to provide suppression and overwatch fires for the ground force during an assault.

d.

Be prepared to provide long-range precision fires for the ground force during their maneuver.

A-5. FIRE SUPPORT

a.

Jointly develop target lists and fire support (FS) execution matrixes. FS execution should be centralized under aviation brigade control.

b.

Jointly develop restrictive fire control measures. Ensure that they are universally understood. Ensure the control measures are standard between the air and ground forces.

A-6. MOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY

a.

Develop a common obstacle plan. Upon attachment of the ground force, request an engineer officer to serve on the aviation brigade staff.

b.

Coordinate counterattack routes through restrictive terrain and obstacles. Consider using the sappers and dismounted infantry to clear chokepoints and obstacles for the ground force.

c.

Consider weapons' range disparities when handing over the overwatch of obstacles to the ground force from an aviation unit.

d.

Ensure aviation air routes (ingress and egress) are clearly understood by the attached ground forces.

A-7. INTELLIGENCE

a.

When conducting intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), include the ground unit's S2 staff. Ensure they provide input into the TF IPB. Key on considerations for ground maneuver that may not be readily apparent to the aviation brigade staff.

b.

Jointly develop reconnaissance and surveillance plans with the ground maneuver staff.

c.

The aviation brigade staff should take advantage of the ground maneuver unit's dismounted reconnaissance capabilities. This can also include counterreconnaissance patrolling in rugged, urban, or densely vegetated terrain.

A-8. LOGISTICS

a.

Be prepared to assist ground maneuver units with moving bulk supplies forward. This is particularly true for Classes I, III, and V; bulk supplies may include Class IV barrier materials as well as critical Class IX.

b.

Collocate ground and air aid stations, if feasible.

c.

Ensure that necessary logistics support from the ground maneuver unit's parent brigade is continually monitored and not interrupted.

SECTION II. Mission Selection

A-9. OFFENSIVE MISSIONS

With an attached ground maneuver force, the aviation brigade has many potential offensive missions. Examples of these offensive operations include—

a.

The aviation brigade conducts a coordinated attack on an objective. The attack is conducted after an attached light infantry battalion has conducted an air assault with brigade assault helicopter assets. During execution of the ground tactical plan, the aviation brigade's attack helicopter battalion can support, by fire, the infantry's advance onto the objective.

b.

The aviation brigade's attack helicopters provide long-range overwatch, suppression, or fixing fires. These actions are for an attached mechanized battalion attacking through restrictive terrain.

c.

The aviation brigade's battalions maneuver against an enemy. The enemy has been fixed by the ground maneuver force.

A-10. OFFENSIVE MEASURES

a.

Stringent control measures are necessary because—

(1)

Differences exist in mobility and firepower between ground units and aviation units.

(2

) Ground and aviation units will be maneuvering near each other in a chaotic situation often during limited visibility.

b.

Fratricide-reducing measures may include—

(1)

Mandated routes (ground and air).

(2)

Specified support by fire or battle positions.

(3)

Restrictive fire lines (RFLs).

(4)

Airspace control areas (ACAs).

(5)

Limits of advance.

c.

A clearly defined chain of command must exist for calling for and clearing supporting fires. The responsible unit and commander must be identified for effective synchronization of fires particularly during simultaneous air and ground maneuver.

A-11. DEFENSIVE MISSIONS

With an attached ground maneuver force, the aviation brigade has many potential defensive missions. Examples of these defensive operations include—

a.

A coordinated air-ground counterattack conducted with the aviation brigade acting as the division's main effort.

b.

Long-range antiarmor fires for ground forces in a deliberate defense provided by attack helicopters from the aviation brigade. This may include observation of obstacles and axes of advance reconnaissance.

c.

A coordinated air-ground deliberate defense of a sector or battle position. (NOTE: While pure aviation units cannot hold terrain, they are suitable for denying terrain.)

d.

An air assault conducted to reinforce a deliberate defense by a ground force.

A-12. DEFENSIVE MEASURES

The aviation brigade commander should be aware of the ground maneuver force's available mobility and firepower when assigning its defensive mission. The type of defense employed will depend on the attached ground force's (light or heavy) capabilities. Considerations for the defense include—

a.

Employment of long-range fires from attack helicopters to support the defense of the ground unit.

b.

The counterattack role—assigning the attack helicopter battalion an engagement area into which the ground maneuver force canalizes the enemy.

c.

Fratricide-reducing measures, which may include—

(1)

Mandated routes—ground and air.

(2)

Specified support by fire or battle positions.

(3)

RFLs.

(4)

Limits of advance as in offensive operations.

d.

A clearly defined chain of command must exist for calling for and clearing supporting fires. The responsible unit and commander must be identified for effective synchronization of fires. Particularly during simultaneous and air and ground maneuver, responsibilities must be clear.

e.

Reconnaissance and rehearsals for the defensive area can be performed with the aviation brigades' helicopters.

A-13. RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY MISSIONS

With an attached ground maneuver force, the aviation brigade has many potential reconnaissance and security missions. These missions are beyond those conducted by the cavalry or reconnaissance squadron. Examples of these operations include—

a.

Conducting an aviation brigade controlled zone reconnaissance. The reconnaissance may incorporate the cavalry squadron, the attack helicopter battalion, and the attached ground force. The aviation forces provide long-range surveillance, while the ground forces accurately assess cross-country trafficability of the zone's terrain.

b.

Conducting an area reconnaissance of a minefield or similar obstacle belt. The ground force focuses direct fires on the obstacle; at the same time, organic aviation brigade helicopters provide overwatch and long-range surveillance.

c.

Conducting a stationary screen in rugged terrain. Attached light infantry and aviation brigade organic attack and assault helicopters are used in this mission.

d.

The aviation brigade’s acting as a covering force during both defensive and offensive operations; the brigade uses attached ground forces and a direct support (DS) artillery battalion during these operations.

SECTION III. Mission Planning

A-14. DESIGNATION OF TASK FORCES AND TEAMS

When aviation brigades accept ground maneuver forces, they normally arrive as a pure unit (no task organization), a TF, or a team. These organizations have a specific numbering and naming convention.

a. Task Force.

The two definitions of a TF are that one is based on the mission and the other, on organization. The one referred to in this manual is a battalion-size unit of armor or infantry to which one or more company-size units of the other combat arm has been attached or is under OPCON.

b.

Team. At the company level, a temporary grouping of units is called a team. The same rules apply for its formation as for the formation of a TF, except that platoons are the basic building blocks rather than companies.

c. Designations.

(1) TFs and teams may be designated as follows:

- Name of the commander—Task Force Williams.
- Use of code name—Team COBRA.
- Use of numeral—Team 1.
- Use of letter—Task Force ALPHA (Team BRAVO).
- Use of unit designation—TF 2-11.
- Use of branch— Team Mech (TF Tank).

(2) Attached or supporting companies may be renamed to avoid confusion. For example, if the TF has retained its Company A, and another Company A is attached, the attached company could be renamed Company Mech (Tank).

A-15. COMMAND AND CONTROL

a.

The aviation brigade should collocate the attached ground maneuver force's MAIN command post (CP) with the brigade's tactical operations center (TOC). Tactical air coordinator (TAC) CPs can be collocated to make a smooth passage and transfer of the responsibility of zone or sector easier. For missions requiring tight coordination between air and ground elements, the aviation brigade TAC could contain—

(1)

The fire support element (FSE), the ground liaison officer (LO), and the attack battalion LO or S3.

(2)

The ground LO.

(3)

The attack battalion LO or S3.

b.

The ground maneuver force is designated for attachment to, or placement under the OPCON of, the aviation brigade. When this occurs, effective time must be published to bring about the command relationship. This specified time allows both units to set priorities on which units move and when they move. This measure precludes confusion and congestion. The aviation brigade should coordinate with, and complete, the following with the ground battalion(s)—

(1)

Exchange of intelligence, tactical plans, and recognition signals.

(2)

Exchange of standing operating procedures (SOPs).

(3)

Security measures during movement of the ground unit.

(4)

Priorities for use of routes and facilities and provisions for movement control.

(5)

FS and other combat support (CS) to be provided by the aviation brigade.

(6)

Combat service support (CSS) to be provided by the aviation brigade and the ground unit's parent brigade.

(7)

Exchange of liaison personnel.

(8)

Collection and exchange of information on friendly minefields and other obstacles.

(9)

Command and support relationship between incoming CS and CSS units and facilities and the aviation brigade.

(10) Measures to minimize vulnerability to enemy nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) munitions, as well as indirect fire.

c.

Both the aviation brigade and the ground maneuver unit may be assigned to the same division. If so, the division commander, through the G3, likely will direct the time of the attachment and the actions that must occur to facilitate the attachment.

d.

To facilitate the transfer of control, one technique used is to establish a battle handover line (BHL) for the ground force. The BHL—an established point in the battlespace—is a control measure to conduct a smooth exchange of battle responsibility. It is a phase line in which the aviation brigade assumes control of the ground force once its movement begins. The BHL may be dictated by division; it is located to permit the aviation brigade the ability to continue engaging the enemy and assuming control of the ground force.

e.

The attached ground force may be required to move a long distance as part of the aviation brigade plan. If so, the ground force must have priority on clearly identified routes through the parent brigade's area. When possible, routes dedicated for the passing unit's use should be different from parent brigade supply routes. This avoids congestion and confusion; for example, moving light infantry in trucks from a defense to the brigade rear. Once clear of the parent brigade, the ground unit—based on the division or corps movement plan—may be allowed to move quickly on main supply routes (MSRs) to close in the aviation brigade's assigned location. Based on the command relationship, the parent brigade may provide CSS assistance to the force: vehicle recovery, medical evacuation, and emergency repair and refuel of equipment.

A-16. LIAISON OFFICER OPERATIONS

a.

Habitually exercise and properly resource liaison officers (LOs). By doing so, the aviation brigade is more apt to receive timely and appropriate information from the attached ground unit. This should result in more planning time and a better understanding of how the ground commander sees the battle developing. This is critical if there is no habitual relationship between the aviation brigade and the attached unit before starting combined operations.

b.

For successful LO operations, it is advisable not to send newly assigned second lieutenants (2LTs) or warrant officers (WO1s). These officers have the best of intentions; normally, however, they lack the experience to make significant contributions to the unit. This shortfall is not due to lack of effort. The LOs should not be used as couriers for orders and graphics.

c.

The commander must clearly define the specific duties and responsibilities of the LO. This includes LOs from subordinate aviation brigade units, the attached ground unit, as well as the aviation brigade headquarters. The more critical duties and responsibilities include—

(1) Before departure from assigned unit.

(a)

Clearly understand the mission and duties of the LO.

(b)

Know the current situation of your assigned unit. This includes, but is not limited to, concept of operations, unit locations, combat power status, and status of critical supplies.

(c)

Possess current graphics.

(d)

Obtain information and liaison requirements from each staff section.

(e)

Obtain and understand the commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs).

(2) Upon arrival at supported headquarters.

(a)

Report to commander or executive officer (XO); be prepared to brief unit situation.

(b)

Establish communications with assigned unit.

(c)

Visit each staff section and exchange information as required.

(3) During liaison tour.

Take the time to clearly define what you expect of your LO. Use the list below as a starting point. The list you develop may be quite different based on individual capabilities and unit requirements. Keep abreast of the situation of the assigned unit; provide updates to supported headquarters. Monitor and assist in the planning process of supported unit as follows:

(a)

Advise staff on how to best employ assets of the assigned unit. This is especially critical for cross-attachments from 'heavy to light' or 'light to heavy' organizations.

(b)

Record all critical information and pass to assigned unit as soon as possible. Include specified/implied tasks, mission-essential tasks, constraints/limitations, etc. This will later assist your unit in conducting its mission analysis.

(c)

Receive and pass all enemy situation reports (SITREPs) and other intelligence products as soon as possible. This is perhaps the most critical role of the LO during the planning process.

(d)

Conduct adjacent unit coordination as appropriate.

(4) Upon return to assigned headquarters.

(a)

Immediately brief the commander, XO, or S3 on information received.

(b)

Exchange information with appropriate staff sections.

(c)

Assist the unit in conducting the tactical decision making process (TDMP); be prepared to respond to additional liaison requirements.

d.

Keys to success with LOs include—

(1)

Do not accept your LO’s only serving as a courier.

(2)

Identify your LO and begin training him as soon as possible.

(3)

Provide your LO with appropriate equipment, such as radios, vehicles, and a global positioning system (GPS).

e.

TFs typically have problems developing a fully integrated and synchronized plan in a relatively short amount of time. This is one area in which a trained LO can contribute significantly to a unit. The LO can assist the S2 section in IPB and the S3 with course of action (COA) development and wargaming. The commander must ensure that the LO thoroughly understands the planning process and has access to all aviation brigade intelligence products as soon as they become available.

A-17. MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY

a.

When planning for mobility/survivability—particularly for the attached ground force—the aviation brigade must understand the priority of engineer support and how engineers employ their assets.

b.

The priority of engineer effort in the security area normally is given to mobility of the passing units of the covering force; then it is given to countermobility to delay the advance of threat units. The aviation brigade commander determines the priority for engineer support in the main battle area (MBA). He bases the support on mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T). A trade-off between countermobility and survivability exists because they both use the same limited earthmoving resources. Obstacles are emplaced in depth to support the aviation brigade commander's scheme; they are integrated into the fire support plan to maximize the effect of friendly fires. Counterattacks may require improvement of mobility corridors to ensure success. Priority of engineer effort in the rear normally is given to mobility. Then it is given to survivability for command, control, and communications (C3 ), reserve, and CSS assets.

c.

Defensive operations require intensive management of engineer resources allocated to support the aviation brigade plan. The resources usually consist of a combination of divisional and corps engineer units. Upon attachment of the ground force, the aviation brigade should request an engineer LO if one is not already provided. The aviation brigade engineer LO and the aviation brigade S4 coordinate early; they forecast and request the large quantities of required Classes IV and V materials and munitions.

A-18. FIRE SUPPORT

a. Integration of Fire Support

. FS is the collective employment of field artillery (FA), mortars, tactical aircraft, and naval gunfire (NGF) in support of a battle plan. The aviation brigade commander must—

(1)

Integrate all FS and maneuver assets to maximize combat power for the combined arms team.

(2)

Visualize how he will use his FS resources, which subordinate echelon he will weight with FS, and what targets to attack. He visualizes these actions as he develops his battle plan to employ maneuver forces. This helps him establish priorities for engaging targets and allocating fires.

(3)

Ensure the FS plan enhances the maneuver plan and all available fire support is considered along with the S3.

b.

Fire Support System.

(1)

The FS system provides close support for maneuver forces, counterfires, interdiction, and other fires, as required. These fires range from suppression of antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) to suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD).

(2)

Close support fires engage enemy troops, weapons, or positions that are threatening or can threaten the force. These fires are effective in reducing enemy observation, flexibility, and C2. Close indirect-FS—

(a)

Expands battlefield depth.

(b)

Erodes enemy forces.

(c)

Inflicts damage well beyond direct-fire ranges of the aviation brigades air/ground maneuver units.

(3)

Counterfires must be considered in developing a scheme of maneuver. Counterfires attack enemy indirect-fire systems, observation posts, and FA C2 facilities. These fires are planned and executed for offensive and defensive operations.

(4)

Interdiction fires disrupt, delay, and destroy threat forces that are beyond the line of sight (LOS) and cannot fire their primary weapon systems on friendly forces.

c.

The aviation brigade commander and the fire support coordinator.

(1)

The aviation brigade fire support coordinator (FSCOORD)—

(a)

Is the commander of the direct support (DS) FA battalion that supports the aviation brigade.

(b)

Is the aviation brigade commander's primary advisor on FS matters.

(c)

Maintains a working relationship with the aviation brigade commander and his S3 through the planning and execution phases of an operation.

(d)

Is located where he can provide the greatest degree of control over the FS assets available to support the maneuver commander's plan. His primary responsibilities include—

- Establishing and supervising the FSE.
- Planning and coordinating FS on surface targets.
- Supervising preparation of the FS plan and integrating it into the aviation brigade's operation plans and orders.

(2)

The aviation brigade commander and his FSCOORD plan the battle together. This planning includes evaluation and determination of—

- Attack guidance.
- Target selection standards.
- Avenues of approach.
- Interdiction opportunities.
- Weapon systems orientation and task organizations.
- Support of objectives or defensive positions.
- Methods of attack or defense.
- Time of attack or counterattack.
- High-payoff targets.
- Designation of target areas of interest.
- Coverage of obstacles.

(3)

In some cases, FS considerations may drive the scheme of maneuver. There may be insufficient maneuver assets to make the mission viable. If so, FS may accomplish a portion of the mission without committing the aviation brigade's assigned maneuver forces. The aviation brigade commander and his FSCOORD plan FS as follows:

(a)

They determine—through the wargaming process—where the enemy must be slowed or where enemy positions must be breached for maximum total firepower effects. Tactical areas of interest (TAIs) and named area of interest (NAIs)—developed through the IPB process—are integrated into the scheme of FS.

(b)

They prioritize the expected enemy target array. High-payoff targets are identified using IPB products with the guidance provided by target value analysis. Target acquisition assets are directed to locate those high-payoff targets.

(c)

They consider all weapons and combat multipliers available to the aviation brigade. The FS element (FSE) continuously coordinates the efforts of the battle staff; ensures that all assets are integrated in the maneuver commander's plan.

(d)

They execute concurrent planning upon receipt of a mission, continue development of the course of action, refine the operational concept, and execute the plan to develop combat power.

(4)

The FSCOORD—

(a)

Participates with the commander, S3, and S2 in planning and execution of the battle.

(b)

Plans and coordinates execution of the fire FS plan.

(c)

Must plan for displacing his firing batteries to ensure continuous, responsive FS; coordinates with the aviation brigade S3 to manage terrain for his batteries, including those of supporting artillery battalions.

d. Fire Support Planning.

(1)

FS planning determines how and in what volume fires will be used, what type of targets will be attacked, when, and with what means. When planning fires, the FSCOORD must consider METT-T, the commander's intent, and FS guidance. Planning is enhanced when detailed IPB is conducted to identify high-payoff targets.

(2)

The aviation brigade commander's intent determines the specific role that FS will play in the aviation brigade scheme of maneuver. For the aviation brigade, the FSCOORD is critical in developing the Army airspace command and control (A2C2) plan. The FSCOORD plans fires and allocates resources as the aviation brigade commander outlines his scheme of maneuver. He must know and fully understand—

(a)

When and where the commander wants FS.

(b)

What the commander wants in the way of effects, duration, and timing.

(c) The commander's critical targets, target areas, and the target priorities.

(d)

How all the unit's combat power will be integrated with the FA.

e. Execution of Fire Support.

(1)

Execution of the FS plan is a combined arms responsibility. The success of the FS plan depends on how well it is understood by subordinate commanders and fire support officers (FSOs). The FS plan and the aviation brigade OPORD must be rehearsed and specific responsibilities assigned.

(2)

The aviation brigade FS execution matrix provides subordinate commanders and FSOs a summary of the plan. The plan ties execution of fire support to specific events and assigns specific responsibility for that execution.

A-19. ENGINEER SUPPORT

a.

Engineer Assets. Divisional maneuver brigades—infantry and armor—normally are supported by their habitually associated divisional engineer company. This is not always true with the aviation brigade. Along with the order to accept the ground maneuver unit, the division commander must allocate engineer assets to the aviation brigade.

b. Engineer Section.

The division commander allocates engineer assets according to his overall tactical plan. When the aviation brigade is committed, corps engineer augmentation usually provides the aviation brigade with the equivalent of a battalion or more of engineers. The aviation brigade commander's primary point of contact (POC) for engineer expertise, planning, and coordination is the aviation brigade engineer, if assigned. The aviation brigade engineer section—

(1) Provides the commander continuous planning and supervision of aviation brigade engineer assets.

(2) Operates from the aviation brigade TOC.

(3) Maintains communications with the divisional engineer battalion, assistant division engineer, and engineer assets employed within the aviation brigade sector.

c.

Engineer Plans. Coordinated engineer planning ensures that engineer combat resources support the elements of the battle plan—the scheme of maneuver, the FS plan, and the CSS plan. Plans for engineer support concurrently with planning for other battle elements.

d.

Engineer Missions. Engineer missions in the aviation brigade area can be divided into four basic roles as follows:

(1) Countermobility operations.

Countermobility is obstacle construction. Obstacles are used to decrease enemy mobility without hindering friendly maneuver. In open areas, obstacles extend the amount of time enemy units are exposed to friendly fire.

(2) Mobility operations.

Mobility operations reduce the effects of existing or reinforcing obstacles. They improve the movement of combined arms forces and critical supplies. Mobility operations are a part of offensive and defensive operations.

(3) Survivability operations.

Survivability operations—

(a)

Are characterized by the employment of protective measures that decrease the lethality of the enemy's firepower while units fight and maneuver.

(b)

Include the use of countersurveillance measures, such as camouflage, deception, smoke, and the construction of protective positions.

(4) Sustainment engineering operations.

(a)

Engineers perform sustainment engineering tasks to ensure the continuous supply of CS and CSS assets forward.

(b)

Sustainment engineering tasks include replacement of tactical bridges, construction and repair of support facilities, and area damage control.

e.

Family of Scatterable Mines (FASCAM).

(1)

The aviation brigade commander has a wide range of FASCAM assets available. Artillery-delivered FASCAM, Army aviation- and Air Force-delivered FASCAM, and engineer-emplaced FASCAM can be integrated into the commander's scheme of maneuver in offensive and defensive operations. Each system has different characteristics in terms of patterns, self-destruct times, and responsiveness. These characteristics must be considered in the planning process. Long self-destruct mines self-destruct in more than 24 hours; short, in less than 24 hours.

(2)

FASCAM provides a rapid, responsive obstacle emplacement capability to the aviation brigade. The aviation brigade S3 and aviation brigade engineer plan and coordinate use of FASCAM assets despite the means of delivery. A great deal of planning is required for FASCAM emplacement. FASCAM minefields, like all obstacles, must be tied in with terrain and under observation to be effective. Also mines are not particularly effective in open terrain such as the desert.

(3)

The corps commander—

(a)

Is the approving authority for the employment of all scatterable mines in the corps area.

(b)

Usually delegates this authority to the division commander.

(c)

Often retains the authority for emplacement of long self-destruct mines at his level.

(d)

Frequently delegates approval authority for short self-destruct mines to the aviation brigade commander.

(4) The aviation brigade commander—

(a)

May further delegate short self-destruct mine employment authority down to battalion TF commanders; the division commander must concur.

(b)

Must state specifically any delegation of authority to employ scatterable mines specifically in the applicable OPORD; otherwise, the authority is automatically withheld.

(5)

The unit emplacing the mines—

(a)

Immediately reports the pertinent information required by the most expeditious and secure means.

(b)

Sends the report through operations channels to the headquarters authorizing the minefield.

f. VOLCANO Operations.

(1) VOLCANO gives the aviation brigade the capability to produce large minefields rapidly. Air VOLCANO can produce two minefields per sortie when mounting the M139 mine dispenser system on the UH-60 Black Hawk platform.

(2)

The minefields are about 1,115 meters long and 35 meters wide. The minefields are dispensed with their long axis parallel to the route of flight. The mines may be dispensed from both sides of the UH-60 at the same time. If so, two minefields will be created, separated by a mine-free strip of ground about 70 meters wide. These minefields can be useful partcularly in both the offense and defense to support ground maneuver forces. They slow or restrict the enemy's movement; they force him into areas where he can be attacked. They also can be used in conjunction with overwatching aviation fires to protect withdrawing ground forces and allow them to break contact.

(3) Brigade planners must exercise great care when planning Air VOLCANO missions. These missions should not be planned in enemy observation and fire area; the helicopter is extremely vulnerable when flying at the steady altitude, speed, and path required to emplace the minefield. FM 1-113 contains a detailed description of this system and operational planning guidance.

g.

Logistics Considerations.

(1) Engineer operations in the aviation brigade area require close coordination among the aviation brigade engineer, aviation brigade staff, and the fire support battalion (FSB) commander for logistics support. The high density of Classes IV and V obstacle material requires early planning; it also requires a coordinated push forward through the brigade support area (BSA). The aviation brigade S4 must forecast mine and barrier materials. The forecast is based on preliminary estimates by the aviation brigade engineer and FA battalion S3.

(2)

FASCAM delivery is planned and coordinated between the aviation brigade engineer and the delivery agency. This holds true whether supporting engineer units, artillery, Air Force, or the aviation brigade’s organic aircraft are involved.

(3)

Maintenance support for engineer units operating in the aviation brigade area must be closely coordinated among the unit, its own parent unit, and the maintenance support elements in the BSA. The supported unit provides common equipment unit-level maintenance. Engineer equipment maintenance is critical to unit survivability. The fire support battalion (FSB) of the parent ground maneuver brigade provides intermediate DS maintenance to rapidly return the equipment to the fight. The supported unit provides medical support.

SECTION IV. Conducting Tactical Operations

A-20. OFFENSIVE OVERVIEW

a.

Responsive combined arms forces. Combat power in the offense is maximized by organizing responsive combined arms forces. These forces must be able to move rapidly, deliver accurate fire, and maintain continuous communication. Plans must provide flexibility to use any favorable advantage that develops during the attack. When an opportunity for decisive action presents itself, the commander commits all necessary resources. Surprise can be gained by deceiving the enemy's defense. It may be gained also by choosing an unexpected course of action and form of maneuver.

b.

Concentrating and synchronizing assets. Successful offensive action requires concentration and synchronization of all assets. The aviation brigade—and its attached ground maneuver forces—must be synchronized at the decisive point and time to ensure tactical success. Thus, the aviation brigade mission must be focused on specific objectives. When these objectives are secured, they permit control of the area or make destruction of the enemy force easier. Designating main and supporting attacks and tasks to attacking forces gives them a better understanding of the mission; it clarifies their responsibilities The aviation brigade plan will designate—

(1)

The main attack.

(2)

The supporting attack (committed forces).

(3)

The reserve.

(4)

Follow and support forces, if any.

c. Main attack.

By designating a unit to conduct the main effort, the commander identifies his main attack. The main attack is directed to secure the objectives that contribute most to the mission.

d. Supporting attack.

The supporting attack contributes to the success of the main attack by—

(1)

Fixing enemy forces to make the main attack easier.

(2)

Controlling terrain that facilitates maneuver of the main attack.

(3)

Destroying enemy forces that hinder the main attack.

(4)

Deceiving the enemy as to the location of the main attack.

(5)

Preventing or delaying enemy concentration against the main attack.

e

. Reserves.

(1)

Reserves are constituted for commitment at the decisive time and place to exploit success or to ensure mission accomplishment. They should not be used to reinforce failure.

(2)

Reserves provide the commander with the flexibility to deal with unforeseen contingencies. They also add to security, although this is not their primary function. Reserves may consist of maneuver units, CS units, or both. Reserves are specifically used to—

(a)

Exploit success by moving to attack an enemy weakness or vulnerability.

(b)

Reinforce or maintain momentum by passing through or around units held up by enemy forces.

(c)

Defeat enemy counterattacks.

(3)

METT-T determines the size of the reserve. In general, the more vague the situation, the larger the reserve. Whenever possible, one-third or more of the available combat power is retained in reserve.

(4)

Reserves are positioned to—

(a)

Permit rapid movement to points of probable employment.

(b)

Weight the main attack by destroying or blocking enemy counters to the main attack.

(c)

Provide security to unoccupied terrain within the aviation brigade sector.

(d)

Provide maximum protection from hostile observation and fire consistent with mission requirements.

(5)

Reserve missions should be detailed enough to provide the reserve force commander a clear understanding of the aviation brigade commander's intent and commitment criteria. Plans are made to reconstitute a reserve as soon as possible after the original reserve is committed. Designating on-order reserve missions to committed units is a recommended technique.

A-21. SYNCHRONIZING OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Successful offensive operations require all combat, CS, and CSS elements with the aviation brigade AO to be totally coordinated, integrated, and synchronized. Organizing operating systems in this way occurs vertically from corps and division through aviation brigade to battalion. It also occurs horizontally among the staff sections. Major considerations on integration of systems in offensive operations follow.

a. Intelligence.

(1)

The aviation brigade commander's guidance to the S2 should contain the commander's priority intelligence requirement (PIR). After coordinating with the S3, additional intelligence requirements may be recommended to the commander during the S2 and staff IPBs.

(2)

The aviation brigade S2 must prepare an up-to-date enemy data base during the IPB process. This data base will support offensive operations and answer the commander's PIR. The threat estimate and data base identify specific enemy vulnerabilities and weaknesses. This information assists the aviation brigade commander to properly concentrate his available combat power.

(3)

Developing PIRs and IPBs is a continual process throughout the planning and execution of the offensive operation. The aviation brigade intelligence section answers PIRs using a detailed reconnaissance and surveillance plan. The aviation brigade and TF S2s and S3s develop and coordinate the plan. The aviation brigade S2 requests more information and collection assets from the division when the aviation brigade commander's PIR cannot be met by organic aviation brigade assets. The aviation brigade S2 must ensure integration of the PIR into the higher collection plan.

(4)

During the operation, the aviation brigade S2 provides the commander continuous updates of enemy activities and anticipated enemy courses of action. His sources include—

(a)

Reports from military intelligence (MI) assets.

(b)

Eavesdropping of battalion operations and intelligence nets.

(c)

Analysis of reported sightings, and situational templates of the enemy.

b. Fire Support.

(1)

FS can deliver a variety of munitions to support deep, close, and rear operations. FS assets available to the aviation brigade normally are one DS FA battalion and organic battalion mortars. More FS assets may include close air support (CAS); naval gunfire (NGF); and reinforcing, general support (GS); and GS reinforcing FA battalions. Commanders normally allocate more reinforcing and GS reinforcing battalions to augment the fires of the DS FA battalion to the offense than to the defense.

(2)

The aviation brigade FSE is the focal point for integrating all fire support for the aviation brigade. To effectively integrate FS into the operation, the FSCOORD—

(a)

Must understand the mission, the commander's intent, and the concept of the operation.

(b) Must be involved in the planning process from the outset.

(c)

Jointly wargames courses of action with the aviation brigade commander and his staff using the products of the IPB and target analysis processes.

(d)

Produces the FS plans or execution matrix, an attack guidance matrix, and the high-payoff target list (HPTL) after the commander’s decision. These tools fully integrate fire FS for the operation by focusing attack and acquisition systems on enemy systems that must be eliminated.

(e)

Ensures FS assets are properly employed and synchronized.

(3)

Specific considerations for employing FS in offensive operations include—

(a)

Employing weapon and target acquisition systems well forward to provide continuous in-depth support without untimely moves.

(b)

Weighing the main attack by assigning priorities of FS to lead elements.

(c)

Isolating the point of attack.

(d)

Softening enemy defenses by delivering effective preparatory fires.

(e) Suppressing enemy weapon systems to reduce the enemy stand-off capability.

(f) Screening maneuver forces adjacent to enemy units.

(g) Suppressing bypassed enemy elements to limit their ability to disrupt friendly operations.

(h) Interdicting enemy counterattack forces, isolating the defending force, and preventing its reinforcement and resupply.

(i) Providing counterfire to—

- Reduce the enemy's ability to disrupt friendly operations.
- Limit the enemy's ability to rapidly shift combat power on the battlefield.

(j)

Supporting rear operations.

(k)

Supporting SEAD requirements of aviation battalions.

c.

Attached Ground Maneuver Unit.

(1)

Ground maneuver units from other divisional brigades are placed under the OPCON of the aviation brigade commander. The placement is to accomplish a mission or for the duration of an operation. Placement must be in accordance with the division commander's intent and concept of the operation. These ground units may operate with the cavalry squadron. They may conduct reconnaissance and security operations. They may serve as assault elements and conduct air assault operations with the assault battalion or GSAB. Finally, the units may maneuver as a composite force with the attack battalions against a specified objective.

(2)

Ground units under the OPCON of the aviation brigade must be completely integrated into the aviation brigade scheme of maneuver. The IPB process identifies specific potential targets and missions for the ground unit. The ground maneuver commander then gives specific tactical missions to his assets.

(3)

Ground units operating with the aviation brigade or in the aviation brigade AO coordinate locations for assembly areas (AA), forward AAs, and arming and refueling points through the depth of the zone with the aviation brigade S3. In offensive operations, these areas are used in sequence as the main body advances.

(4)

The parent brigade for logistics support is responsible for ground units placed under the OPCON of the aviation brigade. Efficient distribution of certain critical classes of supply may require coordination with the parent brigade's FSB.

A-22. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

a.

The command group is augmented by other special staff as desired by the commander; it is positioned to see and sense the battle. By being well forward, the commander can feel the tempo of the battle, improve communications, and influence the main effort with his presence. The command group frequently is on the move. It relies on the aviation brigade TOC to maintain communications with higher and flanking units.

b.

The TAC CP and the main CP must move frequently during offensive operations. The TAC CP has to perform the C3I function for the main CP during these relocations. Therefore, the TAC CP may be augmented with more people from the current operations, intelligence, operations support, and fire support sections out of the main CP. The signal section will leapfrog multichannel and FM retransmission systems forward to maintain communications.

c.

The main CP will continue to perform its essential current battle coordination; however, the it will weight its effort toward future battle planning. The disruption of frequent displacement has caused much of the command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) structuring for working the current battle to be pushed forward to the TAC CP and command group.

d.

The rear CP and FSB or MSB commanders are committed heavily to coordinate and facilitate the pushing of CSS forward through the cluttered battlefield to sustain the attack. The rear CP and FSB commander initially are concerned with sustaining forward units; providing rear area security; clearing main MSRs; evacuating casualties, equipment, and enemy prisoners of war (EPW); and preparing to reestablish CSS base areas forward.

A-23. OVERVIEW OF DEFENSE

a.

On nonlinear battlefields, units of the division may be bypassed, penetrated, or encircled. Units may not lose overall defensive integrity. However, a massive penetration that threatens the integrity of the defense in depth cannot be permitted. While risks are unavoidable, the fighting strength of the division and aviation brigade must be conserved; cohesion must be maintained.

b.

Defense is based on careful IPB. The aviation brigade commander—

(1)

Plans selective attacks against deep, high-payoff targets to create opportunities for offensive action.

(2)

Uses attached ground forces, fire support, EW, and maneuver in depth to—

(a)

Isolate leading enemy formations.

(b)

Delay, disrupt, and destroy enemy follow-on forces.

(3)

Also may attempt to degrade the enemy's momentum by attacking its follow-on forces, CS, CSS, and C2 ; this may make it more difficult to employ artillery or reinforce, resupply, and direct its attacking echelons.

c.

Deception, operational security (OPSEC), fires, and maneuver against the enemy's flank and rear cause the attacker to dissipate strength; they also use up resources without gaining success. Deep, close, and rear operations are planned to support a coherent battle plan that enables defending forces to defeat isolated segments of the enemy force.

d.

The initial purpose of the defense for the aviation brigade is to gain time. This prevents quick enemy successes that would make a synchronized defense by the aviation brigade impossible. Based on his own estimate of the situation and the higher commander's concept, the aviation brigade commander—

(1)

Decides where to concentrate his main defensive effort and where to economize forces.

(2)

Then assigns missions; allocates forces, fires, and other support; and sets priorities for resources to fight a combined arms battle.

e.

The aviation brigade commander may elect to defend forward or in depth based on METT-T. A defense in the forward part of the sector requires early commitment of the main defensive effort. This may be achieved by either an initial forward deployment of forces or by planning counterattacks well forward in the MBA or even forward of the MBA. A defense in depth may be selected when missions are less restrictive, defensive sectors are deep, and key terrain lies deep in the sector. A defense in depth relies on elements in the security force area and forward elements in the MBA. Through these elements, a defense identifies, defines, and controls the depth of the enemy main effort. The flanks of the enemy main effort are counterattacked to isolate and destroy enemy forces in the MBA.

f.

In both area or mobile defense, the overall scheme makes the greatest possible use of maneuver and offensive tactics. When the enemy has committed its forces, the defender's chief advantage is the ability to seize the initiative and counterattack over familiar ground. Protected by his own defensive positions, the defender counterattacks to destroy the halted, disorganized enemy.

g.

Brigade commanders organize the battlefield for defense by assigning sectors, battle positions, strongpoints—or a combination of all three—to subordinate battalion TFs.

(1)

Sectors—the least restrictive control measures—give battalion TFs freedom to maneuver and decentralize fire planning. TF commanders have total freedom to position or maneuver within their sector but must prevent penetration of their rear boundary.

(2) Battle positions

are used when the aviation brigade commander wishes to retain greater control over the maneuver and position of his TFs.

(3)

Strongpoints are fortified defensive positions. They essentially are antitank nests that cannot be easily overrun or bypassed by tanks; they can be reduced by enemy infantry only with the expenditure of much time and overwhelming forces. A strongpoint is located on a terrain feature critical to the defense or one that must be denied to the enemy. A strongpoint can be used to shape, contain, or fix the attacker. Extensive engineer support is required to establish strongpoints successfully.

h.

Depending on their missions, reserve forces are assigned to AAs or battle positions. AAs are used when the plan for the reserve is to move to another area for employment. The reserve is responsible for the security of the AA. Battle positions are designated if the reserve must defend in depth as a contingency mission.

A-24. PLANNING FOR THE DEFENSE

a. Intent of the Higher Commander.

(1)

The aviation brigade commander must understand thoroughly the corps and division commanders' intents and align brigade operations with the overall mission. The division commander's detailed intent—issued either in writing or orally—depicts the aviation brigade's role in the division battle. In turn, the aviation brigade commander transmits his intent to his subordinates.

(2)

The aviation brigade commander should walk the critical portions of the defensive line with his battalion commanders. This may be impossible. If so, his subordinates should complete a thorough backbrief. This ensures that they understand his intent; that they will implement plans in keeping with the overall defensive concept. As a minimum, the aviation brigade commander must consider—

(a)

IPB.

(b)

Friendly maneuver unit combat power.

(c)

Friendly scheme of maneuver and reserve location.

(d)

Vulnerability to enemy nuclear and chemical weapons.

(e)

Impact of deep and rear operations.

(f)

Use of combat multipliers—fires, obstacles, EW, CAS.

(g)

Logistics supportability of each course of action.

(h)

The human factor—training, morale, experience of subordinates.

b.

Friendly Maneuver Unit Combat Power. The aviation brigade commander—

(1)

Monitors the current combat power of assigned subordinate maneuver and CS units.

(2)

Closely tracks major weapons systems and personnel fill, especially for maintainers, to ensure proper assignment of missions.

c. Friendly Scheme of Maneuver and Reserve Location.

Using obstacles, maneuver, EW, deception, and FS, the aviation brigade prevents the attacker from focusing its full strength at one time and place on the battlefield. These measures create confusion, dilute the enemy's strength, and prevent the enemy from maintaining the momentum of the attack. The aviation brigade commander's tactical scheme includes plans to counterattack. Once exposed, located segments of the enemy force are identified and attacked. The key to the execution of counterattack operations is the aviation brigade reserve.

d. The Reserves.

(1)

The aviation brigade commander's most critical decision during the defense is committing reserves. Once committed, the reserve becomes the aviation brigade main effort and receives priority of support. Early in the planning process, the aviation brigade commander decides fundamentally about the size, composition, and mission of the reserve. A major purpose of the reserve is to regain initiative through offensive action. The reserve does this by launching counterattacks, spoiling attacks, and raids against the enemy. Other purposes of the reserve are to—

(a)

Block penetrations.

(b)

Contain enemy forces that have penetrated.

(c)

React to rear area and flank threats.

(d)

Relieve depleted units and provide for continuous operations.

(2)

The aviation brigade commander—

(a)

Should retain about one-third of his combat power in reserve; METT-T may dictate a larger or smaller reserve. The reserve must remain inactive until committed. This protects it from enemy attack and enhances the shock effect when it is committed.

(b)

Besides designated reserve forces, immediately reconstitutes a new reserve as soon as the original reserve is committed. This restores his ability to influence the battle with maneuver forces.

(c)

Uses decision points developed through the IPB process to trigger execution of contingency plans for the reserve. The reserve makes maximum use of the defensive preparation time to rehearse each contingency plan, in priority. Rehearsals are conducted to the lowest level possible. TAIs are developed to support the reserve when it is committed.

e. The Reserve and Offensive Action.

(1)

In planning contingencies for offensive actions of the reserve, the aviation brigade commander—

(a) Considers the enemy situation.

(b)

Estimates time and distance factors on following enemy echelons based on the IPB process.

(c)

Determines which of his units will attack; where they will attack, where they will be positioned after the attack; and what interdiction or deep attack is necessary to isolate the enemy.

(d)

Must also consider the time and distance factors required to focus his combat power at the decisive point defeat the desired enemy force. This is particularly true for the attached ground force.

(2)

Although he plans for the counterattack, the commander must realize that it is unlikely the action will correspond exactly to expectations. Thus, he answers these basic questions as the situation develops:

(a)

Will an attack facilitate the higher commander's intent?

(b)

Is an attack feasible or should the reserve be employed to contain enemy success?

(c)

When and where should the attack be executed?

(d)

In the event of multiple penetrations, which enemy forces should be attacked and which should be blocked or contained?

(e)

Is the window of opportunity large enough to complete the counterattack before the closure of the next enemy echelon?

f. The Reserve and the Spoiling Attack.

(1)

At times, reserves are used in a spoiling attack role to throw the enemy preparations for the attack off stride. Basic considerations for the spoiling attack are—

(a)

The spoiling attack delays, disrupts, and destroys the enemy's capability to launch its attack or commit a following echelon.

(b)

The objective of the attack is to destroy enemy personnel and equipment, not to secure terrain and other physical objectives.

(c)

Spoiling attacks are not conducted if the loss or destruction of the force jeopardizes the ability of the command to accomplish its defensive mission.

(d)

Mobility of the force available for the spoiling attack should be equal to—or exceed that of—the enemy force.

(2)

Commanders coordinate plans for counterattacks and spoiling attacks using the attack techniques discussed in FM 71-3 and the FM 1-100 series. The spoiling attack has many of the characteristics of a hasty attack, a reconnaissance in force, and raid operations.

g. Reinforcing with the Reserve.

(1)

The aviation brigade commander may decide that his units cannot counterattack with a reasonable chance of success. In these instances, he may position the reserve to contain or delay the enemy to gain time for the employment of the reserve of the higher echelon.

(2)

The reserve is not exclusively responsible for transition from a defensive posture to the offensive. A variety of tactical situations may offer the opportunity for, or even require, defending units to launch hasty or immediate attacks. Such situations include breakout from encirclement, relief of encircled forces, raids and spoiling attacks, and collapse of enemy resistance or unanticipated enemy withdrawal.

(3)

As they plan their battle, the aviation brigade commander and his staff consider how combinations of ground units and aviation units will be integrated into the defensive scheme. This planning includes placement of battle positions, routes, and C2 arrangements. If a ground unit is identified as the reserve, supporting engineer and military police (MP) assets must maintain route trafficability to enable their timely movement throughout the aviation brigade sector. Positioning and moving reinforcements are enhanced by designating the routes. Providing traffic control personnel and guides at contact points to lead reinforcements and brief them on the situation also helps.

A-25. SYNCHRONIZING DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

The aviation brigade commander must integrate and synchronize all CS assets to maximize combat power for the combined arms team. To effectively focus combat power, the aviation brigade commander designates the aviation brigade main effort. This designation links each subordinate commander's actions to those around him, providing cohesion and synchronization. As the aviation brigade commander develops his battle plan to employ maneuver forces, he must visualize how he will synchronize his organic units, the attached ground maneuver unit, and other CS assets (FA, AD, EW, NBC, Engr, and CAS) at the decisive time and place on the battlefield.

a. Ground Maneuver Forces.

(1)

Synchronized employment of organic aviation and ground maneuver forces in the defense begins with coordination between the aviation brigade S3 and the ground unit LO to plan the operations.

(2)

The ability of the ground force, light or heavy, to hold ground in the defense makes them an asset to the aviation brigade. This capability allows the aviation brigade to seize and retain the initiative. Ground maneuver units under the OPCON of the aviation brigade can conduct offensive and defensive operations, reconnaissance, and security missions with air operations.

(3)

As in offensive operations, ground maneuver units that operate with the aviation brigade or in the aviation brigade area must coordinate continuously for battle positions, AAs, maintenance collection points, and other uses of terrain with the brigade S3.

(4)

The parent brigade remains responbile for logistics support of ground units. However, forward support logistics operations are coordinated with the FSB in the parent brigade's BSA.

b. Intelligence.

(1)

The aviation brigade S2 must focus on IPB to plan for the defense and analyze the close operation to predict and confirm enemy intentions. Before the battle, the aviation brigade commander requires specific information about—

(a)

The composition, equipment, strengths, and weaknesses of the advancing enemy force.

(b) The location, direction, and speed of enemy reconnaissance.

(c)

The location and activities of the enemy main body and C3 facilities.

(2)

The aviation brigade and battalion S2s and S3s prepare a detailed reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance, and surveillance plan. The purpose of the plan is to prevent the enemy from seeing and reporting the strength, composition, and location of the aviation brigade. The reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance, and surveillance plan is vital to early detection and identifying enemy reconnaissance in the security area.

c.

Fire Support.

(1)

The aviation brigade commander—

(a)

Weights the main effort by establishing fire support priorities.

(b)

Synchronizes close, deep, and counterfires with maneuver forces to disrupt and weaken the enemy's offensive action and to provide windows of opportunity for friendly offensive action.

(2)

The FSCOORD—

(a)

Uses the IPB process, full integration of intelligence-gathering resources, and the target value analysis process (TVAP) to focus fire support on the systems vital to the enemy's success.

(b)

Focuses his planning effort on—

- Engaging the enemy early to disrupt the cohesion of its attack and reduce its intelligence gathering capability. ( As the enemy enters the security area and MBA, FS will continue to reduce enemy intelligence-gathering effort and ability to mass combat power.)
- Supporting rear operations.
- Providing deep fires to delay and disrupt following echelons.
- Screening friendly movements.
- Providing counterfire to limit the enemy's ability to shift combat power rapidly.
- Integrating fires with the aviation brigade obstacle plan.

(3)

FA and mortars pre-position ammunition and survey firing positions in advance. Control of FS assets is centralized for defensive operations.

d. Air Defense.

AD priorities shift to protecting the covering force, FS elements, BSA, and C2 facilities. Priorities depend on the maneuver unit’s ability to use defensive positions for cover and concealment and incorporate other passive defensive measures. Maneuver units are integrated into the counterair plan by engaging appropriate targets within the capabilities of the weapon systems. Collection and early dissemination of air threat information is required to make this system work.

e. Mobility/Survivability.

(1)

Priority of engineer effort in the security area—

(a)

Normally is given to mobility of the passing units of the covering force.

(b)

Then is given to countermobility to delay the advance of enemy units.

(2)

The aviation brigade commander determines the priority for engineer support in the MBA based on METT-T. A tradeoff between countermobility and survivability exists because they both use the same limited earthmoving resources.

(3)

Obstacles are emplaced in depth to support the maneuver commander's scheme; they are integrated into the FS plan to maximize the effect of friendly fires.

(4)

Counterattacks may require improving mobility corridors to ensure success. Priority of engineer effort in the rear is given to mobility, then to survivability for C3, reserve, and CSS assets.

(5)

Defensive operations require intensive management of engineer resources allocated to support the aviation brigade plan. The resources usually consist of a combination of divisional and corps engineer units. The aviation brigade engineer and the aviation brigade S4 coordinate early to forecast and request the large quantities of required Classes IV and V materials and munitions. (NOTE: Aviation units do not always receive engineer support. The aviation brigade staff must ensure the attached ground force is properly supported by the engineers.)

f. Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense.

(1)

With the increase in weapons of mass destruction, the aviation brigade commander must plan for possible enemy use of NBC weapons and defense units. This is true despite the region where his unit is deployed. The S3 and chemical section must determine how vulnerable the aviation brigade forces are to these weapons. The commander specifies the degree of risk he is willing to accept. The chemical section may suggest changes to the concept of the operation . This occurs when the concept involves unacceptable risks from enemy weapons.

(2)

Brigade NBC reconnaissance operations in the defense—

(a)

Normally identify clean areas, battle positions, movement routes, decontamination sites, and contaminated areas that directly affect operations.

(b)

Immediately pass this information gathered from the reconnaissance effort to higher, lower, and adjacent units.

(c)

Periodically update the information.

g. Combat Service Support.

(1)

Logistics support to the combined arms team must be coordinated during the planning and execution phases of each defensive operation. The S4 and FSB or MSB commander must understand the aviation brigade commander's tactical intent so that service support priorities can be established and logistics operations planned to ensure the supportability of the defense. All CSS activities must look beyond the defense to support opportunities for maneuver units during the transition to the offense.

(2)

The aviation brigade S4 identifies all planned logistics requirements for the ground maneuver force to their parent unit FSB. The FSB TOC evaluates the supportability of the tactical plan. The TOC identifies any shortfalls through a logistics estimate. The aviation brigade commander and S3 use the logistics estimate to evaluate courses of action.

h. Command and Control of Defensive Operations.

(1)

The aviation brigade commander, with key staff, normally fights the battle from the TAC CP. However, his personal presence may be required at critical points, such as battle handover from security forces or commitment of the reserve.

(2)

The C2 facilities are more static than in the offense; therefore, emphasis must be placed on locating them in hardened areas or protective terrain and reducing electronic signature. The main CP should be located as far to the rear as possible while maintaining reliable communications with the TAC CP and subordinate battalions. The main CP focuses on monitoring progress of the battle, forwarding information and support requests, and coordinating supporting units.

(3)

The rear CP anticipates future support requirements; it coordinates with the FSB commander to ensure continuous logistics support to enable friendly units to regain the offensive. Also it focuses on continuity of support for current operations and control of aviation brigade CSS units moving forward from the BSA. The rear CP must continuously monitor the battle and be prepared to immediately assume the role of the main CP, if necessary.

i. Military Police.

MP support in the defense provides battlefield circulation control and area security missions. Depending on the MP mission, emphasis should be on MSR regulation enforcement, assistance for security forces' passage, information dissemination, and damage control functions.

j. Communications.

The aviation brigade continues to use organic FM communications as the primary means of C2; however, wire should be used whenever possible. During defensive operations, the hardening of C2 and logistics signal locations becomes more critical because the aviation brigade CPs conduct fewer displacements. If METT-T factors prohibit effective use of wire and messenger, site protection can be improved by using proper signal security measures.

A-26. THE AVIATION BRIGADE DEFENSIVE BATTLE

a.

Counterreconnaissance.

(1) Counterreconnaissance—

(a)

Is the first part of the defensive battle the aviation brigade must win.

(b)

Is an integral part of the aviation brigade security mission.

(c)

Consists of active measures designed to detect, fix, and destroy, as well as passive measures designed to conceal, deceive, and confuse enemy reconnaissance elements.

(2)

Enemy reconnaissance. The focus of the enemy's reconnaissance is to confirm or deny the intentions and dispositions of the forces it is attacking. The aviation brigade must integrate these measures into a detailed reconnaissance and surveillance plan. The plan is designed to prevent the threat from seeing and reporting the strength, composition, and location of the aviation brigade and its obstacles. The aviation brigade's primary focus in counterreconnaissance is in providing and coordinating intelligence and fire support to help its maneuver units identify, fix, and destroy the enemy reconnaissance forces.

(3)

Monitoring the suspected threat. During the preparation phase, the aviation brigade S2 and intelligence and electronic warfare support element (IEWSE) continually monitor and track the covering force battle. Their purpose is to update the actual threat reconnaissance situation. Specific PIRs are developed and modified to identify, confirm, or deny the expected threat.

(4) Aviation brigade S2 responsibilities.

The aviation brigade S2—

(a)

Recommends changes to the task organization to accomplish the reconnaissance, surveillance, and counterreconnaissance plan.

(b)

Coordinates support from attached, DS, and GS assets, such as ground surveillance radar (GSR), collection and jamming platoons, and FA.

(5) Aviation brigade S3 responsibilities.

The aviation brigade S3—

(a)

Coordinates the counterreconnaissance effort.

(b)

Issues specific directions to the aviation brigade's units on which NAIs they must observe.

(c)

Lists required patrols, ambush requirements, specific observation posts (OP) locations, GSR sites, and reporting and engagement criteria. This ensures the aviation brigade has an effective, coherent, integrated, and synchronized counterreconnaissance effort.

b.

Deep Operations. In the defense, deep operations prevent the enemy from concentrating overwhelming combat power. They do so by disrupting the enemy’s momentum and destroying the coherence of its attack. Effective employment of FS and EW deep attack assets depends on careful and continuous planning and IPB. To successfully conduct deep operations, the FSO, S3, and S2 address and fully coordinate deep operations during all phases of the defense.

c. Security Operations.

(1)

The aviation brigade can perform security force operations as part of a division or corps defense plan. Security force operations include cover, guard, and screen as well as counterattack or defend missions. The most comprehensive mission is the covering force.

(2)

The fundamental purposes of the covering force in the defense are to—

(a)

Defeat/destroy enemy reconnaissance forces attempting to penetrate through the security force area.

(b)

Force the enemy to deploy and confirm the direction and strength of the enemy attack toward the main body.

(c)

Provide time for the main body to deploy forward and laterally.

(d)

Shape the battlefield to enable coordinated transition to the MBA fight.

(e)

Destroy enemy forces in the security area within the covering force's capabilities and missions.

(3)

To do this, the aviation brigade—

(a)

Defends or delays to strip away enemy reconnaissance units, force the enemy to deploy its main body, and cause the enemy to organize an attack against a defending enemy.

(b)

Reveals its main effort as the enemy masses for a main attack.

(c)

Fights forward of the MBS for as long as possible so that MBA preparations can be completed.

(d)

Through its security force, seeks to keep the actual location of the MBA from the enemy. The security area assigned by higher headquarters begins along the expected line of initial contact and extends rearward to the battle handover line (BHL).

(e)

Takes up the security force fight from a series of coordinated, mutually supporting battle positions or sectors.

(f)

When directed to do so, hands over the battle to main battle area (MBA) forces, then moves committed forces to a designated area, and prepares them for further operations there.

(g)

Normally, has its AA well to the rear but in the MBA. There, both air and ground elements can rearm, refuel, and reorganize and prepare to reenter the fight.

d. Control of the Security Force.

The security force normally is controlled either by the division or by the corps. The level of command used for controlling security forces generally depends on—

(1)

The width and depth of the security force area.

(2)

The commander's ability to communicate with subordinate units.

(3)

The availability of control headquarters.

(4)

The number of battalion-size units operating in the security force area.

e. Security Force Operations.

(1)

The size and composition of the security force depend on the commander's estimate of the situation as influenced by the factors of METT-T. An aviation brigade—acting as the security force of a division—may consist of the cavalry squadron, an attack helicopter battalion, and one to four tank heavy battalion TFs. The task organization would also include FA, AD, intelligence, and engineer units. In light units, the aviation brigade would accept light infantry task forces; it would maneuver these units in the security area with organic assault aircraft or ground transportation. Added CAS may be allocated to augment the combat power of maneuver forces found in the security area. MBA FA units are positioned forward to support the security area.

(2)

When the aviation brigade is assigned a security force mission, subordinate units accomplish their missions as determined by the aviation brigade commander. Security is provided by giving MBA forces time to react and room to maneuver; therefore, depth of the security force area influences the allocation of forces and missions. As time versus distance requirements are compared, more forces are allocated to the security force or more distance is provided in the security force area. As a rule in mechanized battle, the minimum defensive security force area should be at least 20 kms in depth. This area forces the enemy to commit combat support forces before its attack into the MBA. For light forces, the security area can be compressed. Enemy repositioning of artillery and air defense artillery (ADA) provides the essential indicators of the main efforts.

(3)

The higher commander's overall plan should call for a security force to orient on an enemy force rather than a specific time requirement. The security force area may be relatively shallow. If it is, the force may be able only to provide early warning of the main attack and strip away the enemy's reconnaissance.

(4)

Unobserved, urbanized, or forested terrain is an avenue of enemy movement. This is true unless the security force is provided with forces to cover such approaches. The aviation brigade's air and ground security force must prevent that infiltration.

(5)

The entire security force is not necessarily withdrawn automatically when the first enemy units reach the MBA. A staggered withdrawal improves the chances for overall success. Even if portions of the security force have withdrawn on some avenues of approach, remaining security force elements continue to fight and maintain surveillance well forward of the MBA. This disrupts the enemy's coordination and reconnaissance efforts. A staggered withdrawal of the security force can facilitate counterattacks forward of the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). This is done by providing observation of, and access to, exposed flanks of penetrating enemy forces. In some cases, the security force can be used to attack first-echelon forces in the rear. It can be committed between echelons to isolate leading enemy units.

(6)

Combat power brought against enemy forces within the security area aids the defense of the MBA. It destroys the enemy force's combined arms integrity and damages its ability to react once it arrives in the MBA. FS tasks in the security area focus on deceiving the enemy about the location of the MBA; they disrupt the enemy's center of gravity before the enemy enters the MBA. FS assists in the defeat of the enemy. FS forces the enemy to commit forces in a piecemeal maneuver and without key functional elements. This is done by—

(a)

Isolating attacking units with deep fires to limit the enemy's ability to mass combat forces.

(b)

Isolating attacking units with offensive EW to prevent the enemy from providing intelligence to follow-on forces and to prevent reinforcement from follow-on forces.

(c)

Destroying accompanying AD systems of the attacking regiments in the security area. This improves the capability of attack helicopters and US Air Force (USAF) aircraft to attack the remaining forces in the MBA. Destruction of the AD radars located by intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) systems denies the enemy the capability to direct its AD systems. Destruction of C2 facilities reduces the enemy's ability to incorporate and coordinate indirect fire with maneuver.

(d)

Destroying engineer assets to reduce mine clearing capability before enemy arrival in the MBA.

(e)

Destroying enemy communications systems, enhancing the EW effort against the remaining radio systems in the MBA.

f. Battle Handover/Passage of Lines.

(1)

MBA brigades assume responsibility for the battle. They do so as security forces begin withdrawal of combat elements across the battle handover line (BHL). The higher commander establishes the BHL. The MBA and security force commanders coordinate the exact location of the BH. They recommend changes to the higher commander. The BHL is reflected graphically as a phase line; it is identified in the proper operation plan (OPLAN), OPORD, or FRAGO. The minimum graphic control measures for a rearward passage of lines also must be depicted. The BHL establishes a boundary between the ground owned by the security force commander and that owned by the MBA commander. The majority of MBA forces normally are positioned between the brigade rear boundary and the FEBA. However, the MBA commander controls the ground forward of the FEBA out to the BHL. He can place security forces, obstacles, and fires in this area to canalize the enemy or to make the withdrawal of security force elements easier. The BHL also marks the location where control of the battle will be passed from the security force to the MBA force. The BHL typically is located 2 kms to 4 kms forward of the FEBA. Here MBA forces can bring direct and observed indirect fires to bear on the enemy to make proper security force activities (such as disengagement, withdrawal, or passage of lines) easier. Specific passage lanes and other details are coordinated between security force and MBA units. When possible, the boundaries of security force units coincide with those of the MBA brigades. The same considerations apply when the brigade provides and controls its own security forces.

(2)

The security force retains freedom of maneuver before passage through the BHL; it passes through the MBA forces as quickly as possible, using multiple passage points. GS and GS reinforcing FA units in the security area pass through the passage points before DS, reinforcing, and attached FA units in the security area. Once the GS and GSR units are in position to support the units, the remaining FA units pass through the passage points before maneuver forces. After the battle handover, FA organization for combat and FS responsibilities changes to reflect the organization necessary to support the MBA.

(3) Coordination between the commander in contact and the commander out of contact is critical. Contact must be maintained with the enemy so that he is unaware that a battle handover is occurring. At a minimum, these elements must be coordinated—

(a) Establishing communications.

(b) Providing updates on both friendly and enemy situations.

(c) Coordinating passage.

(d) Collocating C2.

(e) Dispatching representatives to contact points.

(f) Recognition signals.

(g) Status of obstacles and routes.

(h) FS and CSS requirements.

(4) The rearward passage of lines is the most difficult mission for the aviation/ground TF since the timing of the passage is so critical. The TF must break contact with the enemy to avoid taking major losses during the passage. The most ideal time to execute this operation is between echelons of the attacking enemy force. This natural break—when supported by massed artillery fires, smoke, and CAS from both fixed- and rotary-wing forces—can allow the ground units to execute their passage more safely. Contact points normally are set forward of the BHL on easily identifiable terrain to make coordination between the two units easier. The passage points themselves are both concealed from enemy observation, if possible; they are located where the stationary commander desires the passing unit to enter his sector. Ground and aviation units can use the same passage points or separate aviation passage can be designated. Because of aviation’s inherent mobility advantage, it is usually advantageous to pass the ground forces first. An overwatching aircraft or a vehicle on the ground can execute control of a separate aviation passage point.

(5) The forward passage of lines is simply executed in reverse. Release points for the attacking unit should be established behind the BHL to allow the attacking unit to deploy before crossing. Attack positions in the stationary units sector should be coordinated in advance. The TF commander will maintain contact with the enemy force; his XO normally would be the best choice to coordinate the passage with the attacking unit. At no time during this process can contact with the enemy be lost.

g. Main Battle Area.

(1)

The battle almost always is decided in the MBA. Options for both opponents become less numerous during engagements in the MBA. The aviation brigade adjusts the defensive main effort to defeat the attack based on information received during the security force operations. The defending aviation brigade concentrates the strongest possible forces for decisive action against the enemy main effort and commits them with the greatest possible violence when the enemy acts.

(2)

In the MBA, the aviation brigade directs and controls its fight using direct and indirect fires and maneuver against the assaulting enemy. The aviation brigade's organic fighting systems, with ground maneuver forces, USAF air support, EW, combat engineers, AD weapons, naval gunfire, and the DS and reinforcing artillery units must focus on destroying the enemy. The division supports the brigade fight by providing combat, CS, and CSS; directs operations involving forward brigades; and commits the division reserve when necessary. At the same time, the division conducts deep operations, directs the division engineer obstacle effort, and conducts counterfire operations.

(3)

Brigade operations emphasize execution of battalion plans within the context of the overall brigade concept and use of individual initiative according to mission orders. A brigade's main focus of effort is identified; CS assets and other battalion plans are tailored to support this effort.

(4)

Brigade and battalion commanders—

(a)

Plan and reconnoiter their sectors, counterattack objectives, attack routes, and battle positions in depth throughout their operational areas.

(b)

Direct the fight by specifying which battle positions or sectors their units will occupy, what units do when they get there (defend, delay, attack, or overwatch), and how FS will be integrated into the fight at each location.

(5)

The brigade defends by confronting the enemy with strong combined arms units positioned in the brigade sector. As the enemy attack moves into the defended area, its forces are delayed, contained, separated, and attacked. The brigade uses frontal and flanking fires delivered from well-positioned ground maneuver TFs and attack helicopters; ambushes and employment of reserves against the enemy flanks and rear; and massed fire support. Obstacles are used to slow, canalize, and disrupt the enemy's timetables. Obstacles and fires are critical to fragment enemy mass, degrade trafficability, and confuse enemy command and control by causing the enemy to fight in multiple directions.

(6)

The brigade commander's plan often combines the defense of open spaces and choke points. Counterattacks are developed to exploit the separation of enemy forces that occurs naturally because of the terrain.

(7)

Commanders and planners must recognize the likelihood of penetrations in the MBA. When fighting large, mobile forces, the commander may permit a partial penetration as part of the operational concept; he may then counterattack the flank and rear of the penetration. Penetration of the MBA or separation from adjacent units may occur. If so, MBA forces continue to fight within the commander's intent; they protect their own flanks while striking at the enemy's. When possible, they reestablish contact across areas of penetration. The commander rapidly shifts FS to limit the ability of the enemy commander to capitalize on a penetration. Preparation of counterattack plans are integral to the MBA fight.

h. Rear Operations.

The brigade rear area extends from the forward battalion rear boundaries to the brigade rear boundary. Units in the brigade rear area are responsible for planning defense against Levels I, II, and III enemy threats. Operations against a Level III rear area threat forces a major change in the brigade's mission. The brigade's higher headquarters must provide the flexibility to deal with a Level III threat or accept the responsibility for brigade rear area defense. Rapid response to a rear area threat—particularly Levels II and III threats—is integral to the commander's ability to sustain a viable defense. FS—with its ability to shift on the battlefield faster than other forms of combat power—is key to rear operations.

SECTION V. Logistics Planning

A-27. LOGISTICS FOR GROUND FORCES

a.

Units in direct support or under OPCON of the aviation brigade will coordinate resupply of their elements operating forward with the task force, except as noted in the paragraphs below.

(1)

The ADA battalion or battery commander coordinates for the TF to resupply ADA units in direct support with some classes of supply. This may be directed in higher headquarters SOPs and usually includes Class I, III, and V, and common item IX.

(2)

The aviation brigade provides engineer materials (Classes IV and V) to supporting engineer units. In addition, engineer units under OPCON of the aviation brigade receive Class I, III, V, and IX support to the greatest extent possible. This support is coordinated through or directed by brigade before the OPCON directive becomes effective.

(3)

The parent unit S4 or company commander of the supporting element coordinates with the aviation brigade S4 or headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) commander on resupply of the forward elements. Normally, the supporting units' resupply elements assemble in the BSA; they move to the TF field trains area. The HHC commander then dispatches these resupply elements forward—along with the TF logistics packages ( LOGPACs)—to the LRP. At the LRP, the platoon sergeant of the forward supporting element takes control of the resupply element. These resupply elements maintain contact with the combat trains CP while forward in the FS area. If coordinated between the supporting parent unit and the TF, the resupply of these forward elements is directly managed by the TF. The parent unit must provide the additional logistical assets necessary to supplement the aviation brigade's capabilities. It does not matter how support was coordinated. Any element within the TF AO must be either under the aviation brigade commander's control or at least remain in contact with the combat trains CP to avoid interfering with TF maneuver.

b.

Trains for the attached maneuver force may be centralized in one location (unit trains), or they may be echeloned in three or more locations (echeloned trains). Unit trains are formed in AAs and during extended tactical marches. Forming unit trains with a centralized rear CP provides ease of coordination and control; it increases the trains' security. The S4 with the assistance of the S1 controls unit trains.

c.

The TF CSS assets normally are echeloned into company combat, battalion combat, and battalion field trains. The battalion combat trains are organized to provide immediate critical support for the combat operation. Field trains are normally in the BSA and under the control of the HHC commander. He coordinates with the aviation support battalion (ASB) or rear CP commander for security and positioning.

d.

The most forward CSS elements are the company combat trains. A MEDEVAC team (routinely attached to the company) and the company maintenance team for tracked vehicles, when forward, form the company trains. The company first sergeant—

(1)

Positions these elements.

(2)

Tasks the MEDEVAC team.

(3)

Establishes priority of work for the company maintenance team.

e.

When operating in echeloned trains, the company supply sergeant usually operates from the field trains. Coordination between the company supply sergeant and the first sergeant is conducted through the combat trains CP to the HHC commander over the A/L net. Face-to-face coordination during logistics package (LOGPAC) operations supplements the coordination.

f.

The battalion combat trains include the combat trains CP, medical platoon elements, decontamination assets, all uploaded Class III and V vehicles, elements of the communications platoon, and the nearby unit maintenance collection point (UMCP), with some supporting elements from the FSB. The S4, assisted by the S1, controls the combat trains. Elements of the combat trains operate on the A/L net. When possible, these elements are linked to the combat trains CP by landline.

g.

The battalion combat trains should be close enough to the forward line of own troops (FLOT) to be responsive to the forward units, but not within range of enemy direct fire. The combat trains can expect to move frequently to remain in supporting distance of the combat elements. The following factors govern the positioning of the combat trains:

(1) Communications are required between the combat trains CP, the main CP, the field trains CP, aviation brigade rear CP, and forward units.

(2) Room for dispersion and cover and concealment from both air and ground observation are desired.

(3) The ground must support vehicle traffic.

(4) A suitable helicopter landing site should be nearby.

(5) Routes to logistical release points or to company positions must be available.

(6) Movement into and out of the area must not be restricted.

h.

Built-up areas are good locations for trains. They provide cover and concealment for vehicles and shelter that enhances light discipline during maintenance. When built-up areas are used, battalion trains elements should occupy buildings near the edge of the area to preclude being trapped in the center.

i.

The BMO sets up and supervises the unit UMCP. The UMCP provides forward maintenance support to the TF. The UMCP normally is located near the battalion combat trains. The UMCP and battalion combat trains may combine to form a base cluster for defense.

j.

The field trains usually are in the BSA; the HHC commander controls them. Generally, they include the PAC, the mess sections, the company supply sections, the HHC command post, and the remainder of those elements of the maintenance and support platoons that are not forward.

k.

The BSA is that portion of the aviation brigade rear area occupied by the aviation brigade rear CP, the ASB, or aviation CSS assets of the MSB and the TF field trains. CSS assets in the BSA include these elements, as required—

(1)

Elements from the ground unit's parent brigade FSB.

(2)

Maneuver and CS unit field trains.

(3)

Selected corps (corps support command (COSCOM)) and division (division support command (DISCOM)) resources.

A-28. LOGPAC OPERATIONS

a.

Logistics packages are the most efficient resupply of forward ground maneuver units. The company supply sergeant—under the supervision of the HHC commander and the support platoon leader—organizes LOGPACs in the field trains. LOGPACs are organized for each company team and separate element in the TF. They are moved forward at least daily for routine resupply. When possible, all LOGPACs are moved forward in a march unit, under the control of the support platoon leader. Special LOGPACs are organized and dispatched as required by the tactical situation and logistical demands.

b.

The ground unit S4 must plan and coordinate LOGPAC operations to ensure that they fully support the commander's tactical plans.

c.

Unit SOP establishes the standard LOGPAC. Normally, a company team LOGPAC includes—

(1) Unit supply truck.

This vehicle contains the Class I requirements based on the ration cycle— normally, one hot meal and two meals ready to eat (MREs) per soldier. The supply truck tows a water trailer and carries some full water cans for direct exchange. In addition, the truck carries any Class II supplies requested by the unit, incoming mail, and other items required by the unit. The truck may also carry replacement personnel.

(2) POL trucks.

Bulk fuel and packaged POL products are on these vehicles.

(3)

Ammunition trucks. These vehicles contain a mix of ammunition for the weapons systems of the company team. The unit SOP establishes a standard load; reports and projected demands may require changes to this standard load.

(4)

Vehicles carrying additional supplies and replacements. These vehicles join the LOGPAC as coordinated by the support platoon leader and supply sergeant.

d.

LOGPACs for platoon-sized attachments are usually loaded on a single truck. Water and Class III resupply often is accomplished by using 5-gallon cans and pods mounted on trailers.

e.

When the company LOGPAC has been formed, it is ready to move forward under the control of the supply sergeant. The support platoon leader normally organizes a convoy for movement of all company LOGPACs under his control; in emergencies, he dispatches unit LOGPACs individually. The convoy may contain additional vehicles, such as a maintenance vehicle with Class IX to move to the UMCP, or an additional ammunition or fuel vehicle for the combat trains. The LOGPACs move along the MSR to a logistics release point (LRP). Here the unit first sergeant or a unit guide takes control of the company LOGPAC.

f.

From the LRP, the company first sergeant or guide controls the LOGPAC and conducts resupply. The unit first sergeant informs his supply sergeant of requirements for the next LOGPAC. The supply sergeant collects outgoing mail, personnel, and equipment for movement to the rear. The LOGPAC then follows unit SOP and returns to the LRP or to the field trains.

g.

LRP locations are determined by the S4, based on the tactical situation. They should be well forward and easily located. Normally, two to four LRPs are planned. LRPs, as well as the MSR, combat trains, and field trains locations, are included on the operations overlay, if possible. The combat trains CP notifies subordinates and the field trains CP, well in advance, which LRP(s) will be used. The LOGPAC convoy arrival time at the LRP and the length of time it remains normally are established by SOP. The tactical situation may dictate otherwise. If so, the S4 must determine the time and notify units accordingly. LOGPACs may be scheduled to arrive shortly after arrival at a battle position (BP) or intermediate objective. Subordinates must ensure that the resupply vehicles are returned to the LRP as soon as possible. This allows the vehicles to return to the field trains and begin preparation for the next mission. Class III and V vehicles never sit empty. If the LOGPAC cannot be completed on schedule, the combat trains CP must be notified.

h.

At least one senior representative from the combat trains (S4, S1, or senior NCO) should be present at the LRP while it is in effect. He meets with the unit first sergeants and support platoon leader to coordinate logistical requirements. He ensures that the LOGPAC release and return takes place efficiently. A brief meeting is normally held immediately before the first sergeant picks up his LOGPAC. Coordination may include—

(1)

Changes in logistical requirements reflecting any last-minute task organization.

(2)

Reports on personnel, logistics, and maintenance from the first sergeants.

(3)

First-hand updates on the tactical situation and logistical status.

(4)

Delivery, receipt, and distribution of unit mail.

i.

The company supply sergeant or support platoon leader moves the LOGPAC from the LRP back to the field trains. The supply sergeant and support platoon leader then begin to organize the next LOGPAC.

j.

Resupply of the scout and mortar platoons, the main CP, combat trains, and attached support units must be planned and coordinated. The HHC first sergeant coordinates and supervises resupply of these elements. The HHC first sergeant operates near the TF main CP when forward and at the field trains CP upon completion of daily resupply.

(1)

The platoon sergeant of these elements or senior NCO at a facility must report his requirements to the HHC first sergeant or to the combat trains CP. The most desirable method of resupply is to form small LOGPACs for these elements, which the platoon sergeant picks up at the LRP in the same way as a company first sergeant. Attachments larger than a platoon must come to the task force with sufficient CSS vehicles to carry their LOGPACs.

(2)

In some cases, the HHC first sergeant delivers the LOGPAC to the main CP, combat trains, and scout and mortar platoons. Attachments can receive resupply at one of these locations or as previously coordinated.

(3)

Another option is for attachments to be resupplied from a nearby company team LOGPAC. The S4 coordinates this resupply before the LOGPACs are dispatched.

k.

While the LOGPACs are the preferred methods of resupply, there will be times when other methods of resupply are required.

(1)

Resupply from the combat trains (emergency resupply). The combat trains has a limited amount of Class III and V for emergency resupply. The S4 coordinates emergency resupply from the combat trains and then refills or replaces the combat trains' assets.

(2) Pre-stocking.

Pre-stocking is placing and concealing supplies on the battlefield. This normally is done during defensive operations when supplies are placed in subsequent battle positions.

(3) Mobile pre-positioning.

This is similar to pre-stocking except that the supplies remain on the truck, which is positioned forward on the battlefield.

A-29. TRAINS SECURITY

a.

CSS elements behind the FLOT form base clusters and must be prepared to defend themselves against guerrillas and partisans, and forces that have broken through or bypassed the defense.

b.

The S4 is responsible for trains security when operating in a unit trains configuration. When trains are echeloned, the S4 is responsible for securing the combat trains; the HHC commander is responsible for securing the field trains. If the TF commander collocates his field trains with the BSA, the HHC commander coordinates with the ASB commander and/or the brigade rear CP commander to integrate the TF field trains into the BSA defensive plan. In all trains areas, a perimeter defense is normally planned. Elements in the trains are assigned a specific sector to defend. Mutually supporting positions that dominate likely avenues of approach are selected for vehicles armed with heavy machineguns. Reaction forces and operations are established, based on the unit SOP. To enhance security, an alarm or warning system is arranged. Sector sketches, fire plans, dispersal plans, and obstacle plans should be prepared. Rehearsals are conducted to ensure that all personnel know the part they play in the defensive scheme. The officer in charge (OIC) at each location establishes a shift schedule for operations and security on a 24-hour basis.

A-30. BASE DEFENSE OPERATIONS

a.

When developing his overall plan, the aviation brigade commander ensures that the positioning and organization of the BSA supports the rear operation objectives. The ASB commander, Brigade S4, Brigade S1, or a designated alternate is responsible to the aviation brigade commander to secure, position, and operate the BSA. The key planning task is to ensure that there is a plan for rear area security, and units in the FSB are executing that plan.

b.

Well-planned and tenacious base defense is the cornerstone of successful rear operations. Base defense operations are enhanced by the extensive use of obstacles, sensors, surveillance devices, and OPs. Supporting units must be prepared to conduct small-unit security operations and defend themselves against all levels of threat. Base defense operations include all actions that units occupying a base take to protect themselves from the enemy. They consist of a combination of passive and active measures including—

(1)

MP patrolling and reconnaissance operations

(2)

Hardening and dispersal actions.

(3)

Cover and concealment.

(4)

Deception.

(5)

Immediate reaction to enemy threat or attack.

c.

Units operating within the BSA are placed under the OPCON of the ASB or rear CP commander for security and positioning within the BSA. All elements operating within the BSA establish radio, wire, or messenger communications with the ASB TOC or rear CP if the brigade has no ASB. The ASB CP and aviation brigade rear CP collocate to facilitate coordination and rear area security.

d.

Areas in the rear that are devoid of tactical units or are isolated because of troop disposition should be reconnoitered by MP patrols. Coordination with other divisional and nondivisional assets deployed within the aviation brigade area of operations must occur to ensure overall linkage of rear operations plans. The S3 coordinates patrolling and reporting with the MP unit commander as part of the MP area security mission.

SECTION VI. Stability and Support Operations Planning

This section concentrates on lesson learned as well as general employment guidelines for ground forces employed in stability and support operations (SASO) in the military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT) environment. The aviation brigade may receive attached or light or heavy forces under its OPCON for operations in urban terrain. The challenge for the aviation brigade commander is proper employment of the ground force with the brigade's organic aviation units.

A-31. MILITARY OPERATIONS ON URBANIZED TERRAIN

a.

Fratricide. Urban terrain provides high potential for fratricide because of the likelihood of close quarters (high-weapons density), recognition problems, and unfamiliar secondary effects of weapons. During a recent conflict, soldiers employed several ineffective and dangerous techniques to breach various fences, walls, and barred doors. Soldiers used grenades, rifle fire, and even antitank weapons to breach these barriers. They should not be used. Commanders should schedule opportunities to practice live-fire demolition and breaching techniques in realistic situations with actual munitions.

b.

Direct Fire during MOUT Operations. Direct FS—even from just a block away—is very difficult to control. During a recent conflict, a brigade told mechanized forces providing FS that the light infantry force had cleared a tall hotel building only to the second floor. In fact, the infantry force had cleared to the tenth floor and was fighting a counter-sniper engagement. Seeing this fire and apparently some weapons protruding, the mechanized forces began to suppress. This drew return fire from the friendly light force. To prevent this, the following should occur—

(1)

All units must have routine techniques for conspicuously marking cleared rooms, floors, and buildings as they progress through an urban area.

(2)

Marking procedures must be automatic, practiced, and discernable at night. Soldiers must be able to understand these procedures with limited preparation time.

(3)

During MOUT operations, units should develop a numbering and marking system for all buildings and landmarks to simplify coordination of maneuver and supporting fires.

c.

Use of Underground Sewer Systems. Many towns have sewage systems or underground passages for electric or telephone cables. Some cities also have underground railways or rivers. It is important for both attacker and defender to be aware of and assess the tactical value of such underground systems. If belligerents have difficulties crossing checkpoints, they may decide to go under it by way of the city's sewer system. This can be a way for belligerents to circumvent checkpoints until the friendly force obtains diagrams or maps of the sewer system. When dealing with underground sewers—

(1)

Use engineers to emplace mines, boobytraps, barbed wire, trip flares, or other obstacles to deter use of the sewer system.

(2)

If necessary, remove manhole covers, lower lights on wires, and maintain a 24-hour watch over the open holes. Use 20-minute shifts to maintain soldier alertness.

(3)

Be prepared to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance of underground facilities.

d.

Clearing Multistory Buildings. Doctrine dictates that multistory buildings should be cleared from the top down. But in a built-up area of modern cities, rooftops often become death traps because of their exposure to nearby buildings that are taller. As units assemble on a roof before entering a building, they can become easy targets for a sniper firing from another building only a few feet away. When operating in a multistory building—

(1)

Treat rooftops as danger areas.

(2)

Maintain dispersion and cover while on rooftops. Designate weapon systems to provide covering and suppressive fire, if needed.

(3)

Expect the possibility that one sniper might be luring soldiers into the sights of another sniper in a nearby building.

e.

Communications.

(1)

To avoid interference with the communications of host nations, frequencies must be cleared with the host government. Because of this there is a security risk. Direct references to the identity of call signs and codes can compromise security. Any breach must be reported to the force headquarters. Most peacekeeping forces normally use fixed call signs and frequencies. Remember that this allows the belligerents to monitor and/or jam communications.

(2)

In multination operations, each national contingent of the peacekeeping force is responsible for providing its own internal communications systems. Because these systems are for national use only, the nation's native language and radio procedures are used. Normally, one nation will be tasked to furnish communications to the joint force headquarters and common communications equipment to all nations in the force for C2.

(3)

For SASO, deploy with redundant communications assets. Be prepared to provide communication packages to liaison personnel. For peace enforcement operations, be prepared to employ normal US secure communications to protect forces and to control combat operations.

f.

Urban Communications. Operations in urban areas have shown how easily very high frequency (VHF) radios are screened and their ranges are reduced. As a consequence, radios must be carefully located to maximize their effectiveness. Retrans stations and remoting of antennas to high ground are methods to maximize VHF radios. To ensure high-quality communications—

(1)

Operators must use the upper end of the VHF band and high-power switches on radios to improve communications.

(2)

Commanders must be prepared to encounter difficulty in establishing and maintaining communication. They must set limited objectives, covering a small area, and plan for the frequent relocating of rebroadcast stations to ensure communications.

(3)

Ground and heliborne retrans stations must be used to maintain communications.

(4)

If time and the battle situation allow, maximum use should be made of the civilian telephone system, if it is operational.

(5)

EW may be used as a major part in the urban environment.

g. Use of Weapons in Urban Environment.

Within the confines of house-to-house fighting, all infantry weapons are of value if correctly used. However, a knowledge of house construction is necessary to avoid endangering one’s self, fellow soldiers, or innocent bystanders. For example, attempting to fire through the ceiling of a room to neutralize the occupants of the floor above or below may be disastrous if the house has concrete floors. Similarly, to throw a fragmentation grenade into a room with wooden or plaster walls is equally self-defeating. Soldiers in peace operations should avoid unnecessary noncombatant casualties and damage to property. If the situation is not life threatening, negotiation, persuasion, and show of force should be used before violence is applied. Below is a discussion of weapons in MOUT.

(1)

The sniper rifle can best be used to pick off belligerent leaders or key individuals and to keep armored vehicles buttoned up. Also it can be used effectively in a countersniper role.

(2)

Machineguns are the main supporting weapon in urban fighting. About 100 rounds of 7.62 millimeters (mm) can create a hole 1 foot in diameter in a brick wall 20 inches thick. Another 300 rounds can enlarge the hole to 2 feet by shifting the point of aim and firing in a spiral method.

(3)

The 60mm mortar is effective in providing smoke; it can be fired low angle against the sides of buildings to achieve a shorter range than would otherwise be possible. The high explosive (HE) round is invaluable for firing over buildings and reaching dug-in belligerents in gardens and similar types of enclosed cover.

(4)

The grenade is a basic tool for house and room clearance. The destructive effect is determined by the type of construction in the structure. Grenade launchers also are extremely valuable in urban areas because of the variety of rounds available.

(5)

The light antitank weapon (LAW) and antitank (AT)-4 weapons have a primary purpose of disabling or killing lightly armored vehicles. They can be fired through windows or doors to eliminate snipers. High explosive antitank ( HEAT) rounds are unsuitable for making entry holes through brick or concrete walls.

(6)

Claymore mines are well suited for protective obstacles. They are suited for not only above ground but also on rooftops and in underground facilities such as sewers and subways. They cannot breach wire obstacles such as chain-link fence.

h.

Converting an Urban Structure into a Strongpoint. Belligerents are likely to convert houses or buildings into a strongpoint. A platoon-size strongpoint will comprise one or two sturdy buildings with basements or semi-basements. These are usually located at crossroads, on street corners, or overlooking a bridge or open ground such as parks and squares. The aim is to maximize fields of fire and to provide multitiered layers of fire. The basic building blocks of a strongpoint defense are—

(1)

Adapt the building for multilayered fire. Most weapons, including antitank and medium machineguns, will be on the ground floor and in the semi-basement. Snipers and automatic riflemen (with grenades and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs)) will fire from upper stories. Attics can be used for mortar positions and for AD weapons (heavy machineguns and hand-held surface-to-air-missile systems (SAMSs)).

(2)

Block doors and windows with sandbags, bricks, or earth-filled furniture. Fire from openings created in the sandbags or cut through walls. Create false openings to draw fire; cover real ones when not in usewith suitably painted plywood.

(3)

Reinforce floors and firing positions to reduce the effects of collapse as a result of shell fire. Cover floors with up to 1.5 meters of earth or two layers of sandbags.

(4)

Remove stairways to complicate enemy clearing. Use ladders for Internal movement between floors. Outside fire escapes should be blocked with wire or booby traps.

(5)

To reduce the effect of flame attack, remove combustible materials or cover them with earth. Shields can be placed in front of openings. Underground shelters should have 15 to 20 centimeter-high walls of earth in front of their entrances to stop napalm.

(6)

Make basements, storerooms, medical points, and command posts into shelters against bombardment. Every underground facility must have at least two exits. The exits should go in different directions; at least one should be in the form of a covered connecting passage whose exit is beyond the possible distance of collapsing rubble (i.e., two thirds the height of the nearest building).

(7)

Give ground floor exits blast-proof protection and have them lead to a communications trench.

A-32. CONDUCT OF STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

a. Mission Focus.

The severity of human suffering during a recent deployment by US forces caused commanders to try to alleviate the situation on their own. Units were deployed to the field to provide security for the humanitarian relief agency convoys of food. Some local commanders saw the appalling conditions; they realized they were not tasked to give food or provide direct support to the population. Therefore, they took it upon themselves to try to arrange for or speed up relief supplies. While well-intentioned, this activity diverted the commanders' attention from their primary mission; it tended to upset the Humanitarian Relief Organizations’ (HROs’) planning to prioritize and distribute relief supplies. Commanders should remember the following lessons during these operations:

(1)

While well-meaning, commanders must focus on the primary mission; they must not be distracted by missions that correctly belong to the HROs.

(2)

Assisting the HROs in their efforts—not usurping the HROs mission—is the best way commanders can perform their mission and assuage their conscience.

(3)

Soldiers of all ranks and responsibilities, as well as the suffering population, should be reminded of their obligation to accomplish the mission, and where the dividing line falls.

b.

Peacekeeping Patrols.

(1)

Units will have to conduct patrols during peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping patrols perform a dual mission of showing the flag and monitoring any agreements. The patrols may move on foot, be mounted in vehicles or in light aircraft or utility helicopters. Peacekeeping patrols normally will be only overt and conducted during the day. When planning for peacekeeping patrol, remember—

(a)

Peacekeeping patrols are totally different from normal combat patrols.

(b)

The mere presence of a peacekeeping patrol, or the likelihood that one may appear at any moment, deters potential violations of peace agreements.

(c)

The presence of peacekeeping troops in a tense situation may have a reassuring and calming effect in troubled areas. If it is necessary to operate at night, the patrol will use lights, carry an illuminated peacekeeping flag, and move in as openly as possible.

(2)

Major considerations for peacekeeping patrols include—

(a)

Patrols must be easily recognizable by all belligerents.

(b) The peacekeepers flag must be carried by all dismounted patrols and displayed on all vehicles used during mounted patrols.

(c) Patrols should not deviate from the planned route without contacting higher headquarters.

(d) Expect to be challenged by belligerent forces while on patrol. Rehearse proper responses to challenges.

(e)

Ensure that maps carried on patrol are unmarked. Memorize positions. Each patrol should always include a member who knows the area well.

(f)

Log all observations and events while on patrol. Memorize details for sketch maps. Do not mark on maps if there is the smallest chance of being stopped by one of the belligerents.

(g)

Do not surrender weapons, maps, logs, or radios without the permission of higher headquarters.

(h)

Upon return from patrol, immediately report any significant observations to the debriefing officer. Mark maps and draw sketches while the memory is fresh. These maps and logs provide the basis for the investigation of incidents and the lodgement of protest.

(i)

The unit S2 or intelligence officer must be assimilated intimately into the peacekeeping patrol process.

c. Peace Enforcement Patrols.

Peace enforcement patrols can be either overt or covert. The normal principles of combat patrolling apply to peace enforcement patrols. Combat patrols also can serve the same purpose as peacekeeping patrols, but the soldiers are not hindered by the administrative restrictions on vehicle marking and weapons restrictions. Based on the situation, the commander must determine whether patrols conducted by peace enforcers should follow the overt methods of peacekeepers. Given the peaceful intent of peace enforcers, patrols should operate as openly as the situation allows. Force protection, as always, is a major consideration. Units will have to conduct patrols for reconnaissance, surveillance, perimeter security, and to protect airfields. Units will have to conduct security patrols around airfields to keep SAMs out of range of arriving aircraft. Considerations for these patrols include—

(1)

Use the normal combat patrolling techniques and procedures during peace enforcement operations.

(2)

Apply aggressive patrolling tactics to deter hostile acts by the belligerent forces.

d. Negotiation and Mediation.

(1)

Peacekeeping officers may find themselves in the role of negotiator, mediator, and even arbitrator at the point of confrontation. If possible, negotiations on matters affecting both parties should be carried out jointly with the two sides. On occasion, relations between them may be so strained that the peacekeeper has to serve as an intermediary. A peacekeeping negotiator must be firm, fair, and polite if he is to gain and keep the trust of both parties. The negotiator must be amaster of detail, tact, and patience. He must have a sense of proportion, resourcefulness, objectivity, and impartiality. On matters of principle, he must be insistent without being belligerent. He must be careful not to pass the confidences of one side on to the other. If officers become negotiators in a tense situation, they must remember the following lessons:

(a)

Negotiations are not always successful. Agreements of all parties may or may not occur.

(b)

Remain neutral and do not allow yourself to be used by either belligerent.

(c)

Expect some of the belligerents to negotiate in bad faith. They may attempt to twist the issues to prolong negotiations while they continue to violate peace agreements.

(d)

Negotiations are time-consuming and often frustrating. However, negotiation reduces unnecessary loss of life and offers the best long-term prospects for a final peaceful settlement. It is vital to remain impartial and courteous at all times.

(2)

Some helpful hints for conducting negotiations are as follows:

(a)

Familiarize yourself with the problem.

(b)

Collect all available evidence.

(c)

Determine if the point of issue has been raised before.

(d)

Find out what agreements or understandings have a bearing on the problem.

(e)

Be certain of the peacekeeping forces policy on the problem.

(3)

Prepare for the negotiation:

(a)

Select and prepare a meeting place acceptable to both parties.

(b)

Obtain adequate interpreters and communications assets.

(c)

Secure the meeting area and delegates from attack.

(d)

Ensure that a common map edition and scale are used by both sides and the peacekeeping force.

(e)

Keep your headquarters informed.

(4)

Conduct negotiations:

(a)

Remember to exchange customary salutations and courtesies.

(b)

Introduce yourself and any advisers. Make sure all the delegates are introduced by name.

(c)

Use some introductory small talk to make the delegates feel at ease and to assess their mood.

(d)

Allow each side to state his case without interruption and without making any premature judgements or concessions. Make a record of the issues presented by each side.

(e)

If one side makes a statement that is known to be incorrect, be prepared to produce evidence or proof to establish the facts.

(f)

If there is a peacekeeping force-preferred solution, present it and encourage both sides to accept it.

(g)

Be sure to close the meeting by explaining to both sides exactly what has been agreed upon and what action they are expected to take. Be prepared to present this in writing for signatures if necessary.

d. Fire Support Considerations

. During peace enforcement operations, the primary FS mission is counterfire operations. Counterfire in mountainous terrain has the same basic considerations as any other operation. There are some specific considerations because of the terrain and likely threat. FS considerations for peace enforcement operations are—

(1)

Select sites for the firefinder radars that are on prominent terrain. This is necessary to get the screening crest as low as possible. The Firefinder Q-36 radar may need to be placed in a city or town. If so, it may have to be air-lifted onto the top of a building to gain coverage of the surrounding area.

(2)

Redundant overlap coverage of firefinder systems may be required. It is difficult to obtain a low and consistent screening crest in mountainous terrain. A too low screening crest drives the search beam into the ground. A too high screening crest allows the belligerents to fire under the beam and avoid detection. The Q-36 system will not accept more than a 30-mil variance in the screening crest. The Firefinder Q-37 radar system will not accept more than a 54-mil variance.

(3)

Ensure that firefinder radars in the area do not face one another and radiate at the same time. This causes interference and emissions burnout; it results in equipment failure. If radars need to face one another to accomplish the mission, coordinate to ensure they do not radiate at the same time.

(4)

Use digital radar maps to minimize the time required for height correction of the weapon system. Digital maps allow the firefinder systems to initially locate weapon systems to within 250 meters. This allows the operator to make only two or three visual altitude adjustments to accurately locate the weapon system.

(5)

Mountainous areas have unique weather conditions that affect ballistics drastically. Wind speed and direction can vary considerably depending on datum plane and which side of the mountain you occupy. Frequent meteorological (MET) messages are essential; the FDO should consider registering to improve accuracy.

(6)

Consider angle of fall in each fire mission to determine the best method of engagement and unit to fire. When firing against the opposite slope of a ridge or mountain, the angle of fall can be critical to successful target engagement. When shooting, low-angle, large-range probable errors may be caused by the terrain.

e. Suppression of Artillery.

(1)

Suppression of artillery used to harass population centers and airfields will be a formidable task during peace enforcement operations. It cannot be suppressed by air power alone. When faced with an air threat and counterbattery threat, belligerents will seek to protect their artillery by exploiting its high mobility (especially the mortars) and using concealment offered by terrain. Weapons may be deployed individually, rather than in batteries. Weapons may re-deploy from one camouflaged position to another after firing a few rounds. Weapons may be located in populated areas such as near schools, hospitals, or other restricted fire areas. This complicates the delivery of counterbattery fire through fear of inflicting civilian casualties and collateral damage.

(2)

To deal with such an artillery threat, the force should deploy artillery-locating radars and howitzers, as well as artillery forward observers. These, in turn, will require considerable numbers of infantry to protect them. The forces required to achieve and maintain suppression of belligerent artillery to a distance of 20 km of their target areas could be very substantial; they could impose a logistic burden that would threaten to use up the resources needed for security of any humanitarian relief operations.

(3)

The Firefinder Radars (Q36/Q37) are effective in the detection of belligerent indirect fire units. They are positioned in a manner to ensure the immediate detection of units firing on critical facilities such as embassies, headquarters, airfields, and hospitals. The radar's position requires careful coordination with coalition radars and any joint or combined targeting cells.

(4)

Techniques for suppressing artillery follow.

(a)

Use precision-guided munitions or attack helicopters to conduct counterbattery fire to reduce unnecessary collateral damage.

(b)

Deploy artillery with the peace enforcement force. Besides counterbattery fire, artillery can fire illumination and smoke rounds if needed.

(c)

Deploy firefinder radars to support suppression of combatant artillery and to document violations of cease fire agreements and fix blame for damage and civilian casualties. This information can be passed to the media (if approved by commander) to give an accurate portrayal of the situation to the world.

f.

Belligerent Air Defense Tactics. For the most part, belligerents usually rely on passive measures to protect themselves from US or coalition air attacks. Depending on the terrain, they may take advantage of the abundant concealment and camouflage available in forests and mountainous terrain. Since the end of the Cold War, many small factions have access to large numbers of handheld SAMs and light ADA. As the war in Afghanistan showed, clever use of such assets in mountainous terrain can be very effective against a modern air force. ADA guns and SAMs can be deployed along likely avenues of approach to targets. Belligerent patrols with handheld SAMs often try to infiltrate close enough to operational airfields to engage aircraft on landing or during takeoff. The belligerents are often satisfied by causing the peacekeeping force to take a defensive reaction that commits large numbers of soldiers to forming an impenetrable cordon around the airfields.

g. Aviation Support to Peacekeeping Forces.

Helicopters provide the force with flexible, versatile support. They perform such missions as C2, transport relief supplies, escort convoys, and transport wounded or injured soldiers. They can also be used as a show of force and for surgical strikes to retaliate for attacks on friendly forces. Recent US experience in stability operations have shown the following tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to be effective:

(1)

The aviation LO should coordinate flight corridors between each cease-fire sector. Expect limitations on the use of flight corridors times such as from 0700 to 1900 each day. Coordination must be made with belligerent military forces and with normal civilian air traffic controllers. Consider linking the flight corridors to the friendly convoy routes. They can be mutually supporting to peacekeeping operations.

(2)

The night infrared (IR) archlight mounted on a helicopter should be used to enhance the visibility of soldiers with NVDs. The use of regular white-light searchlights also can enhance night operations depending on the ADA threat.

(3)

Navigation is crucial and often difficult. Expect existing navigational aids to be either turned off or destroyed. Fit all aircraft with GPS to assist with navigation.

(4)

Helicopters should have the usual indentification friend or foe (IFF) transponder codes for AD and air traffic control (ATC). One of the problems they have is that nap-of-the-earth (NOE) flying could be construed by ground forces as aggressive. So they may have to fly high, out of range of small arms fire.

(5)

C2 aircraft communications assets will be upgraded based on METT-T. Some systems may work better in mountainous terrain than in desert environments. Consider using INMARSAT, TACSAT, and high frequency (HF) radios.

h.

Mine Warfare Operations. Recent operations have demonstrated the requirement for accurate prediction, detection, removal, proofing, cleared route marking, and area clearance of landmines during operations other than war. Whenever soldiers enter areas where others have fought, they will encounter large numbers of unexploded ordnance and inevitably operate in unmarked and uncleared mined areas. To reduce the impact on friendly force, consider the following:

(1)

Landmines will continue be a significant threat to future force projection operations and stability and support operations. In every major peacekeeping arena from Cambodia to Bosnia, mines and fabricated explosives continue to take a toll on troops and civilians.

(2)

Units should train on detection, removal, cleared route marking, proofing and area clearance operations. Develop unit drills for dealing with mines and unexploded ordnance.

(3)

Heavy mine-clearing capability—such as mine plows and mine-clearing line charges (MICLICs)—may not be appropriate during SASO, when MSR road surfaces should not be destroyed.

(4)

Exploitation of human intelligence (HUMINT) is a good source of information of suspected minefield locations.

(5)

Look for signs of mining activities, which include dead animals, craters, blown vehicles, disturbed soil, etc.

(6)

Helicopters trying to find a suitable landing zone should consider landing in fields with grazing animals. If the animals move about the field without detonating mines when the helicopter begins its approach, the field should be considered safe for landing.

A-33. USE OF TANKS IN PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

a.

Infantry forces are best suited for peace enforcement operations; however armor forces can make significant contributions to the operations when attached to the aviation brigade. Tanks are potent weapons systems when performing traditional functions, but they also make excellent infantry support weapons. Some of their capabilities are—

(1)

Antitank and antiarmor.

(2)

Intimidation of belligerent forces.

(3)

Heavy weapons support to infantry fighting vehicles.

(4)

Target acquisition especially at night using thermal sights.

(5) Survivable to mines and light AT weapons.

(6)

Provide advanced guard support to convoys.

(7)

Provide support during search and attack operations.

(8)

Protect infantry against automatic weapons fire.

b.

Some advantages to using tanks during peace enforcement operations are—

(1)

Armor/Mech can be rapidly emplaced at decisive points throughout sector to support threatened United Nations (UN) forces.

(2)

Heavy forces have extremely high visibility; they can deter aggression by belligerent forces (consider firepower demonstrations as a show of force).

c.

Some disadvantages of using armor during peace enforcement operations are—

(1)

The enemy can focus on, isolate, and destroy armor forces in a piecemeal fashion.

(2)

Tanks have limited bunker and building destruction capability.

(3)

Tanks and other armored vehicles destroy the secondary roads and MSRs.

(4)

The size of armored vehicles often block narrow country roads and can destroy private property during movement (may offset attempts to gain support of local civilians).

d. Light/Heavy Forces.

There is no pure "heavy" or "light" scenario in peace enforcement operations. The best way to achieve success is to balance the array of tactical capabilities in accordance with METT-T. The combined arms concept requires teamwork, mutual understanding, and the recognition by everyone involved with the critical roles performed by other arms. The success of the mission and the lives of soldiers depends on the ability to understand and synchronize the complexities of the light/heavy force.

e. Armor Considerations for Built-Up Areas.

There are several difficulties in using tanks in built-up areas. Tanks can provide effective support to infantry operations in built-up areas, but infantry teams must be assigned to protect each tank from short-range antitank weapons. Consider the following during planning:

(1)

Mobility is restricted because tanks are confined to roads or streets that often require clearance of debris, and possibly mines.

(2)

When possible, tanks should take advantage of parks and gardens that offer the best fields of fire.

(3)

Buildings may restrict the full traverse of the turret; therefore, elevation of the main armament may be insufficient to reach top floors and rooftops. However, the commander’s machinegun is not so restricted.

(4)

Tanks are particularly vulnerable to short-range antitank weapons. Their crews, if exposed, may become casualties from snipers. Tanks must, therefore, move through builtup areas buttoned up. They must move in short bounds using suppressive fire and be supported by other tanks.

SECTION VII. Brigade Rehearsals

"A poor plan thoroughly rehearsed has a greater chance for success than an excellent plan that is not rehearsed." (George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It, 1947).

A-34. OVERVIEW

a. The aviation brigade commander should conduct rehearsals to ensure understanding and synchronization between the organic brigade aviation units and the attached ground maneuver force.

b.

There are many techniques for conducting rehearsals. Whatever the technique chosen, rehearsals help—

(1)

Clarify the commander's intent.

(2)

Expose flaws or disconnected activities in the plan.

(3)

Reinforce the scheme of maneuver.

(4)

Focus on actions and decision points critical to accomplishing the mission given the unit's current state of training and expected terrain and weather conditions.

(5) Ensure that subordinate commanders explicitly understand their missions, how their missions relate to each other, and how each mission relates to their commander's plan.

(6)

Provide feedback to the senior commander.

c.

Rehearsals instill confidence in participants; confidence is crucial. It—

(1)

Gives participants faith in their own plan's success as well as in their commander's plan.

(2)

Provides subordinate commanders with purpose, direction, and motivation.

(3)

Enables leaders to execute missions with speed, flexibility, and audacity.

d.

The commander also can use rehearsals to reinforce understanding of the plan by helping subordinates visualize the exact meaning of his intent. Moreover, repetition of tasks leaves a lasting mental picture of the sequence of key actions within the operation.

e.

To effectively and efficiently employ rehearsals, units must use them habitually in training. Units at every echelon must routinely train and practice a variety of rehearsal techniques. Unit SOPs must identify appropriate techniques and standards.

A-35. TYPES OF REHEARSALS

The seven types of rehearsals are as follows: full, key leader, terrain model, sketch map, map, radio, and backbrief. These seven types range from extensive preparation—in time and resourcing—to minimal preparation. Each takes a decreasing amount of time and resources to prepare and conduct the rehearsal. Each rehearsal technique has different degrees of benefit (the understanding that participants gain). The commander can select the one that strikes the closest balance between the time available and the unit's level of understanding of his concept of operation.

a. Full Rehearsal.

(1) Full rehearsal produces the most detailed understanding of the mission. However, it consumes the most time and resources; it involves every soldier and system taking part in the operation. If possible, units should conduct full rehearsal under the same conditions (weather, time of day, terrain, etc.) as the unit will encounter during the actual operation. For example, for range operations, units can conduct a full rehearsal over the actual terrain either in vehicles or in aircraft.

(2) Of all the rehearsal types, full rehearsal is the most difficult to accomplish.

b. Key Leader Rehearsal.

(1)

This rehearsal takes less time and resources than a full rehearsal, because it involves only the unit's key leaders. During key-leader rehearsal, the commander first decides the level of leader involvement he desires. His selected leaders then rehearse the plan using their assigned tactical vehicles or helicopters while traversing the actual terrain. Terrain requirements are the same as for a full rehearsal; only the number of participants changes. For example, the unit company commanders conduct a rehearsal for their companies at the range complex with the battalion commander.

(2)

Because of the reduced number of participants, the key-leader rehearsal usually takes less time. In the training environment, commanders use the tactical exercise without troops (TEWT) technique as one way of conducting a key-leader rehearsal.

c. Terrain Model Rehearsal.

(1) This rehearsal takes less time and fewer resources than a key-leader rehearsal. If the modeler constructs the terrain model accurately, this rehearsal technique can significantly help subordinate leaders execute the training according to their commanders' intentions.

(2) When possible, place the terrain model where it overlooks the actual terrain of the AO. The model's orientation should coincide with the actual orientation of the terrain to help participants orient to the actual area of operations.

(3)

The size of the terrain model can vary—from a simple table-top arrangement to a large model on which the participants can walk. A large model helps reinforce participants' perception of relative positions of units on the actual terrain. This rehearsal technique also helps participants visualize the execution of the mission.

(4)

To create an accurate terrain model, the modeler (designated by the commander) completes the following steps:

(a) Step 1.

The modeler first determines the scale. He can easily do this by "walking off" so many steps per km; for example, on a range 6 kms by 2 kms, the modeler could assign one step to 1 km and walk off the scale of his terrain model. The modeler also could use another form of scaled metric measurement, such as centimeters to meters or meters to kms.

(b) Step 2.

Lay down grid lines on the same scale as on the map the commander uses to plan and control the operation. After establishing grid lines, the modeler can use them as references to measure the size and location of terrain features. This simple step greatly increases the accuracy of the terrain model, keeps terrain features in the proper scale, and reinforces participants' memories as they use their maps during the actual operation.

(c) Step 3.

The modeler labels all terrain features, phase lines, and objectives with appropriate names as the range OPORD prescribes. The terrain model must depict all of the information shown on the operation overlay. An arrow on the model must depict magnetic north (south in the southern hemisphere).

(d) Step 4.

The commander or his designated representative assembles the rehearsal participants in front of the terrain model. The commander and each subordinate leader walk through a sequential (either by phase, event, or time), interactive, verbal execution of the operation, including decision points and branch plans.

d.

Sketch Map Rehearsal.

(1)

A sketch rehearsal takes less time and resources than a terrain-model rehearsal. Units can conduct this rehearsal almost anywhere, day or night. The procedures are the same as for a terrain-model rehearsal, except the commander uses a sketch for a model.

(2)

Sketches must be large enough for all participants to see as the commander and his staff talk each subordinate leader through a sequential, interactive, verbal execution of the operation.

e. Map Rehearsal

.

(1)

A map rehearsal takes even less time and resources than a sketch map rehearsal. The unit can conduct a map rehearsal day or night. The procedures are similar to the sketch map rehearsal, except the commander uses a map and operation overlay of the same scale as he used to plan and control the operation. Using the map, the commander and his staff walk each subordinate leader through a sequential, interactive, verbal execution of the operation.

(2)

To ensure clarity, the commander should conduct this rehearsal at a vantage point overlooking the terrain of the AO. He can use one of two commonly used map-rehearsal techniques. One has each subordinate leader following the rehearsal on his own map and overlay; the other involves laying the map and overlay horizontally, moving unit symbols across the map as in a wargame to show the planned sequence of action-reaction-counteraction following the range synchronization matrix.

f. Radio Rehearsal.

(1)

Communications are critical during range operations. The commander may decide to exercise communications links between various facilities (TAC CP, TOC, Rear CP, etc.) using a radio rehearsal.

(2)

The commander and his staff conduct radio rehearsals by interactively and verbally executing critical portions of the operation over established communications nets. This is accomplished in a general sequence of events that the range operations order establishes. When used, these rehearsals should include all communications facilities and equipment necessary to conduct that actual portion of the operation. To be effective, all participants must have working communications equipment and a copy of the OPORD and synchronization matrix.

(3)

This type of rehearsal generally takes less time and fewer resources than other types of rehearsals (except for the backbrief); however, this may not always be the case at higher command echelons.

g.

Backbrief Rehearsal.

(1)

This type of rehearsal takes the least time and resources. The commander, along with his subordinates, can use it to identify flaws or problems in the operation but to a lesser degree than in other types of rehearsals. Also, this technique allows the commander to clarify his intent early in his subordinates' decision making process. A backbrief is effective when used with another type of rehearsal. The commander can conduct the backbrief day or night, in person, or by radio or landline.

(2)

During the backbrief, each subordinate commander briefs the commander on how he intends to accomplish his mission before be issues his OPORD to his respective unit. By briefing and explaining his intent and concept of operation to his higher commander, the higher commander ensures that his subordinate commander's intent is properly nested with that of his own. Flaws or potential problems with the operation may also be revealed at this time.

NOTE:

Do not confuse the backbrief with the confirmation brief that the commander uses immediately after he issues an OPORD; he uses the confirmation brief to learn how well a subordinate commander understands the mission, task, or directive he has just been given. In this case, he normally requires subordinate commanders to restate what he wants them to do and why. Typically, the confirmation brief occurs at the conclusion of the orders or OPLAN brief when all subordinate commanders are present. He adjourns the session only when he is confident his subordinates understand their mission—the commander's intent, concept of operation, scheme of maneuver, the time plan, and the type and location of the rehearsal.

A-36. PREPARING FOR A REHEARSAL

a. Commander’s role.

During rehearsals, the commander's role is crucial. He is the driving force in the interactive exchange of action, reaction, and counteraction that cements the plan in his subordinates' minds. He focuses his staff to create the rehearsal conditions that best replicate the future battle. Finally, whether the commander, XO, or S3 conducts the rehearsal, the commander is responsible for the effectiveness of the rehearsal. The commander and staff should begin detailed rehearsal planning when the commander approves a course of action.

b. Step 1.

The commander selects the rehearsal technique when he issues his guidance. This enables a small portion of the staff to begin to prepare the rehearsal site (selection, security, and construction, as required).

c.

Step 2. The commander then approves the plan and decides whether to conduct a rehearsal that includes the entire operation or one that covers only critical portions of the operation. Reducing the rehearsal to critical portions saves time but might sacrifice comprehension of the whole plan. Time may be the driving factor of the commander's final decision.

d. Step 3.

The commander next refines the time plan that the staff prepares for the execution of the mission. The time plan consists of allocating the amount of time available to conduct the training before execution.

e.

Step 4. The commander and staff develop a short list of action-reaction-counteraction events. They base this short list on their understanding of actions that may occur during the conduct of the operation. This list becomes the script for the rehearsal and guides the commander through major events.

f. Step 5.

The last step is to conduct the rehearsal. The commander, or his designated representative, plays the role of controller and commander. He orders the action by time or event just as he would during the conduct of the range operation. This rehearsal allows the unit to rehearse each critical action, practice contingencies and branch plans, and verify planning factors. One staff member becomes the recorder for any adjustments to the plan or unresolved questions that the rehearsal produces. As a minimum, he should include every event on his execution matrix.

A-37. CONDUCTING A REHEARSAL

a.

Participants can use the following sequential guidelines during rehearsals:

(1)

Orient participants to the training aid and the terrain.

(2)

Define the standard (that is, what the commander will accept as satisfactory performance for the rehearsal).

(3)

Visualize and synchronize the concept of operation. Verbally walk through the concept of operation. Subordinate commanders should interactively verbalize their unit's actions, entering or leaving the discussion at the time they would expect to begin or end their tasks or activities during the operation. This will help the commander assess the adequacy of synchronization.

(4)

Focus on the key events and the synchronization required to achieve the mission.

(5)

Address any points in the operation where the execution of branches or sequels are likely to occur. This includes critical points where slowdowns will likely occur and influence the operation.

(6)

If the standard is not met and time permits, rehearse again.

(7)

For feedback, make the necessary changes to the synchronization matrix.

b. Before Rehearsal.

Once participants assemble at the rehearsal site, the rehearsal leader briefs them and leads the rehearsal. His briefing must include an introduction and overview and an orientation.

c. Introduction and Overview.

(1)

The rehearsal leader introduces himself and all other participants as appropriate. He then—

(a)

Gives an overview of the briefing topics, the rehearsal subjects and sequence, and the time line (specifying the not later than (NLT) ending time).

(b)

Explains participation in afteraction report (AAR), how and when they will occur, and how he will incorporate changes into the existing order.

(c)

Explains, in detail, restrictions imposed on the force, such as the use of pyrotechnics, weapons firing, or radio transmissions.

(d)

Ensures that all participants understand safety precautions and enforces their use.

(e)

Emphasizes results and what standards of task execution he expects.

(f)

Allows leaders to relate any results of tactical planning or rehearsals they may have already conducted.

(2)

If the subordinate unit recommends a change to the existing plan, the commander or the S3 acts on what he recommends before the rehearsal begins (when possible). However, before the rehearsal ends, a decision will resolve the recommendation.

(3)

The rehearsal leader gives an orientation to familiarize participants with the terrain or scale model in use. He also issues supplemental materials, if appropriate. He identifies magnetic north on the terrain model or scaled terrain and points out objects and terrain features representing actual terrain features. He also explains whatever graphic control symbols, obstacles, or FS targets are represented. The rehearsal leader always concludes the orientation with a call for questions.

d. During Rehearsal.

After the briefing, the rehearsal begins after the rehearsal plan. The commander or S3 observes and critiques all portions of the rehearsal. Critiques center on meeting the commander's intent and coordination between units. The internal execution of tasks within the rehearsal usually is left to the subordinate unit commander's judgment and discretion. Leaders at all levels conduct periodic AARs to ensure that units rehearse tasks to acceptable levels of competence and that substandard performance is not reinforced.

e. Afteraction Reports.

AARs also provide an opportunity to incorporate lessons learned into the existing plan or into subsequent rehearsals. Subsequent rehearsals may employ additional complexity and realism as time and the commander permit.

f. After Rehearsal.

After the rehearsal, the commander reassembles participants to conduct an AAR. He reviews lessons learned and makes only the absolute minimum required modifications to the existing plan. (Normally, these changes are effected by issuing a FRAGO).

(1)

This meeting also allows the commander to issue instructions or reminders and to reiterate his intent. Subordinate commanders incorporate any changes the commander makes to the existing plan into their units' orders and plans. Such changes are also briefed to any key leader or unit that did not take part in the rehearsal.

(2)

Changes to the plan should serve as refinements to that plan; they should not be characteristically radical or significant. Changes that are not critical to the execution of the operation can confuse subordinates and desynchronize the plan and, therefore, should be resisted. Before the rehearsal is ever executed, the plan or order should be developed with at least the basic five paragraphs and necessary overlays issued or published. Publication of all annexes may not yet be completed; however, the details should already be developed.

A-38. TRAINING AIDS KIT, FIELD EXPEDIENTS, AND REHEARSAL DEVICES

a. Training Aids. Rehearsal training aids augment participants' imaginations; they help them share the same visualization of the operation. Training aids are especially useful with terrain models. The training aids kit minimizes the scrounging of expedients so participants can direct rehearsal preparation efforts to completing the fourth step of the preparation procedures. This same kit can be used for both tactical and range operations.

b. Training Aids Kit.

The training aids kit's basic components are the same for light or heavy units. The components are climate-specific (for example, arctic, desert, jungle, or temperate), because climates have varying effects on certain materials (such as spray paint). The quantities of the kit's components are a function of the size of the model and the number of times the trainer will use the model before he must replenish expendable portions. A kit suitable for a small terrain model (such as a sand table) consists of—

(1)

A vehicle's first-aid box painted brown on the outside except for the two locking tabs that are white. White tabs on the kit box enable a user to quickly open and close it in the dark.) The box's interior is also white.

(2) A small-arms repair parts box. This small box fits inside the first-aid kit; it can hold miniature vehicle replicas and map symbology such as—

- AAs.
- Checkpoints.
- CPs.
- Coordinating points.
- Decontamination points.
- Engagement areas.
- Passage points.
- Objectives.
- Unit symbols.

(3) Miniature vehicle replicas, like those used in the Dunn-Kempf simulation (micro armor).

(4)

A map protractor to which is attached a brightly colored (orange, red, yellow) thread about 1/2-meter long.

(5)

Cotton balls, to simulate smoke.

(6)

String (gridlines).

(7)

Lacing wire, to simulate wire obstacles.

(8)

Tongue depressors, to simulate bridges and breaches.

(9)

Pipe cleaners, in assorted colors.

(10)

Powdered chalk, in watertight containers such as tubes. The kit must contain blue, red, white, and black (charcoal) chalk.

(11)

A pencil sharpener, to grind stick chalk into powder.

c. Components.

The components of this kit are all available through the supply system or the self service supply center (SSSC). All components will fit into the first-aid box. The first-aid box must be water tight; it must be able to fit into the back pocket of the Alice pack (ruck sack).

d. Larger Terrain Models.

Larger terrain models require larger training aids than those in the smaller kit. All participants must be able to see and read them. Spray paint replaces chalk, engineer tape replaces string, and a ruck sack or a small, durable box replaces the first-aid box.

e. Field Expedients.

Rehearsal training-aid kits require augmentation by field expedients. Otherwise, the training aids kit would become too large and troublesome to be of practical use. Like the components of the kit, field expedients represent some feature of the terrain, enemy or friendly disposition, or some type of activity (smoke, minefields, preplanned fines). Field expedients are truly only limited to the imagination of the terrain modeler and rehearsal participants. Some examples include—

- Stones, deadfall branches, leaves, vegetation, and so on.
- Canteens.
- Cans.
- MRE cases.
- Ponchos or the side of a vehicle to be used as a chalk board.
- Vehicle tarps.

f. Aviation Mission Planning System (AMPS).

The AMPS provides the brigade an automated rehearsal capability. The planner can program his route of flight into the system and fly his route of flight on screen before mission execution.