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Appendix G

Deep Operations

This appendix gives an overview of deep operations to include scheme of maneuver and planning. It outlines 10 steps generally required to execute a deep attack with attack helicopters and provides a deep planning checklist. It maintains continuity with other capstone Army doctrine; therefore, it refers to the traditional battlefield framework of close, deep, and rear. This traditional battlefield framework will become increasingly convoluted and ambiguous; the future battlespace will be fluid, high tempo, and nonlinear. In the near future, a more viable framework may be simply close and extended operations. On the nonlinear, noncontiguous battlefield of the future, aviation forces must be prepared to conduct seamless, simultaneous operations in all directions. Thus, the spacial constructs of the future battlefield may change. However, the mainstay of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) at brigade level and below—discussed in this appendix—remains valid. This is true whether the TTPs are employed in today’s deep operations or the extended operations of the 21st century.

G–1. DEEP OPERATIONS OVERVIEW

Deep operations must be based on careful analysis of the enemy's potential to interfere with current and planned operations. Normally, only those enemy forces that threaten friendly operations are relevant. Priority should be given to those targets vulnerable to interdiction that are most critical to the enemy's operations. A thorough intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and timely intelligence from supporting sources can identify targets that—when destroyed, damaged, or neutralized—most impede the enemy's ability to concentrate forces, control operations, or support the operation at critical times.

a. The corps aviation brigade is one of the corps commander's main instruments for projecting combat power in the deep operations area. The corps commander can seize the initiative and create opportunities for offensive exploitation. He accomplishes this by timely and aggressive incursions against enemy second–echelon forces; command, control, and communications (C3) nodes; and critical combat service support (CSS) operations. Whether the corps is in a defensive or an offensive posture, deep operations are planned and executed continuously as a part of the corps scheme of maneuver. Corps aviation forces focus mainly on deep operations during darkness; division aviation forces focus mainly on close and rear operations.

b. Corps attack helicopter battalions—as well as their divisional counterparts—attack and wear down enemy combat and combat support (CS) forces. Deep operations for corps aviation assets focus chiefly on reserves, exploitation forces, and long–range artillery of the first operational echelon. Corps aviation brigades often operate independently or as a pure aviation force in deep operations. The corps aviation brigade may interdict second– and, possibly, third–echelon divisions of the first–echelon army or first–echelon elements of the second–echelon army. With corps aviation forces, the corps commander may want to stop the enemy from introducing additional combat and CS forces into the corps area of operations (AO). Specific objectives may include—

(1) Limiting the enemy's freedom of action.

(2) Altering the tempo of operations in favor of the division and corps.

(3) Denying the enemy the ability to concentrate forces.

(4) Isolating close operations on advantageous terms (set the terms of battle) by—

(a) Reducing the closure rates of uncommitted forces.

(b) Preventing introduction of additional combat and CSS forces within an AO.

(c) Delaying, disrupting, diverting, or destroying forces and activities within an AO.

c. Corps aviation brigades also may conduct air assault operations. With ground maneuver units, assault and medium helicopter units can assist in securing deep objectives. Medium helicopter and command aviation assets also provide CS; CSS; and command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) enhancement.

G–2. SCHEME OF MANEUVER

Deep employment requires timely intelligence, effective command and control (C2), responsive CSS, and combined arms execution. It is characterized by flexibility, speed, surprise, and shock action. Therefore, corps aviation units must have direct access to deep intelligence–gathering sources. During deep operations, the corps aviation brigade conducts missions to support the commander's overall scheme of maneuver—defensive or offensive.

a. Defense. In defensive maneuvers, deep operations should disrupt the enemy's time–sequencing of follow–on echelons and sever lines of communication. To support the corps defensive scheme of maneuver, aviation brigade forces conduct offensive operations such as attacks by attack helicopter groups. These attacks may disrupt, delay, and destroy enemy follow–on forces and their logistic operations. Corps attack forces often take part in these attacks as part of combined arms operations to seize or destroy critical objectives.

(1) Detailed IPB is critical to this operation. IPB products allow the commander to track the movement of the independent tank regiment (ITR). Thus, he can synchronize the entire effort to deliver the maximum effect on the enemy at the most effective point on the battlefield. Such a point would offer long–range fires for attacking aircraft while constraining the enemy force to the engagement area (EA).

(2) Time for detailed planning is essential for deep operations. The main planning consideration is the timing required to catch a moving enemy force in the EA. Intelligence assets must be focused early and sufficient planning performed or the deep operation may be ineffective. Therefore, a reverse–planning sequence is used. While no set time interval is established for warning, preplanned actions will be more effective than short–notice reactions to enemy initiatives. The key is a close and continuous watch on the battlefield in depth and an accurate assessment of probable enemy actions.

(3) Early notice is required to obtain US Air Force (USAF) resources for suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) or objective area operations; thus, preplanned sorties are armed and prepared. When enemy helicopters threaten the force, screen operations may be planned and conducted. These screens must be distant enough from the main body of the group to allow time for counteraction or response. Night operations offer more protection to the force; however, they make navigation and adverse weather avoidance more difficult.

b. Offense. During initial attacks in offensive campaigns, aggressive actions in deep operations—such as destroying tactical reserves, logistic centers, and CS systems—can reinforce success in close operations. Then as the offensive operation develops, deep operation efforts can block withdrawal routes and isolate and weaken forces. During the exploitation and pursuit, constant pressure can be maintained on the enemy. The specific missions of striking forces depend on the situation. Their missions can be classified into three basic types: operations of limited duration, such as raids; operations to secure deep objectives; and operations to continue the attack. In each operation, alternatives may include pure employment of attack assets, employment of attack assets with an air assault task force (AATF), or employment of aviation assets with ground maneuver forces.

(1) Operations of limited duration. Operations of limited duration may resemble raids or ambushes. As in defensive operations, thorough IPB, timely information, and well–coordinated actions to suppress enemy air defenses are essential. While the destruction of the enemy force is the primary objective, the operation may also play a part in the corps deception plan. Raids and ambushes can rapidly wear down available enemy counterattack forces, making other friendly operations more successful.

(2) Operations to secure deep objectives. Operations to secure deep objectives are deliberate attacks or operations with the goal of occupying terrain in the enemy's rear area.

(3) Operations to continue the attack. These operations exploit successful corps or division offensive campaigns or battles. They prevent the enemy force from reconstituting its defense.

G–3. PLANNING FOR DEEP OPERATIONS

Attack helicopter battalions conducting a deep attack normally will operate at night. As a rule, they require 24 to 48 hours of planning time to execute an attack. They also require accurate and timely intelligence before and during the mission. Aviation deep attack should be characterized by high–payoff targets that are critical to the corps commander's campaign plan. Aviation deep attack operations are the most effective choice against a moving objective (enemy forces). Paragraphs G–4 through G–13 outline the10 steps generally required to execute a deep attack with attack helicopters.

G–4. STEP 1: INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

a. Intelligence collection and analysis efforts feed the IPB process. This process integrates the analysis of terrain, weather, and the enemy. Corps and division IPB is continuous and integrated into the deep fight through the deep operations coordination cell (DOCC). The IPB focuses on—

(1) What the enemy force consists of.

(2) Where the enemy is currently located.

(3) Where the enemy is going.

(4) The time lines for the movement.

b. During this IPB, named areas of interest (NAIs) and target areas of interest (TAIs) on the enemy mobility corridors will be designated. Planners construct the decision support template (DST), using these named areas, templated enemy positions, and anticipated enemy rates of movements. TAIs eventually become EAs for attack helicopter operations and areas in which targets are located for artillery fires and electronic warfare (EW) targets.

c. The IPB determines which specific second–echelon target is selected. The staff constructs an attack criteria matrix that lists and compares specific targets and considers time of attack. The effect on the target, the duration of the effect, and the attack system best suited to destroy or delay the enemy element are analyzed. This analysis passes to the DOCC for further refinement and integration into the scheme of maneuver.

G–5. STEP 2. DEEP OPERATIONS CELL

a. The DOCC conducts targeting meetings twice daily. The corps DOCC focuses on targets to be serviced in the next 72 to 96 hours. The division DOCC focuses on targets to be serviced in the next 24 to 72 hours.

b. Through analysis, these targets become specific high–value or high–priority target sets, organized into the high–payoff target list (HPTL). These targets are deemed by the DOCC to be critical to the plan. From the HPTL analysis, the DOCC can recommend an appropriate system to service the target.

c. Based on the DOCC's recommendation, the commander issues his guidance on the target to attack and the system(s) to use for the attack.

G–6. STEP 3. STAFF PLANNING PROCESS

a. As the commander's issues his guidance, the deliberate staff planning process begins. The G2 staff continues the terrain analysis. Using maps, photos, and the help of the engineer topographic team, the staff analyzes projected ingress and egress routes as well as potential EAs. The staff examines the combined effects of weather and terrain as well as available illumination. The staff also considers the effect that the enemy disposition may have on friendly operations. It considers, particularly, the selected target, enemy air defense (AD) locations, and major uncommitted units (regiment and higher). The staff selects NAIs based on terrain where the enemy commander has to make decisions. TAIs—which likely becomes the EA for the attack—are selected based on terrain.

b. H–hour is established for all systems taking part in the deep attack. The H–hour must allow time for—

(1) Suppression of enemy systems that were identified during the IPB.

(2) Units to be alerted, move to their positions, and conduct the mission.

G–7. STEP 4. DESIGNATING THE ENGAGEMENT AREA

a. The planners develop a sensor matrix that matches sensors to targets. These sensors must be able to collect information against the targets. This matrix will assist later in preparing the collection plan.

b. From the IPB, planners select an EA along the principal avenues of approach. The EA should canalize enemy forces and restrict their movement as well as provide terrain masking and good fields of fire for attack helicopters. The corps IPB to support the aviation portions of the mission will include terrain analysis to determine the effect of terrain on both enemy and friendly operations. Weather and illumination during the deep attack also are analyzed from both perspectives. Members of the planning staff must be familiar with the capabilities and limitations of enemy and friendly systems. Army aviation factors include night vision devices (NVD) effectiveness, infrared crossover, and Hellfire missile environmental characteristics.

G–8. STEP 5. DEVELOPING THE COLLECTION PLAN

a. Once the EA is designated, G2 planners determine when the enemy will be in the EA. The G3 selects decision points (DPs) along the route to determine when to launch the attack.

b. For example, if aviation units require a 2–hour notice before the enemy enters the EA, DPs must be selected along the avenues of approach at approximately 2 hours’ traveling distance from the EA.

c. The G2 develops a collection plan based on available resources to support the selected DPs, NAIs, and TAIs. This plan—

(1) Provides adequate coverage.

(2) Synchronizes sensors (cueing, cross–cueing, and jamming).

(3) Requests national and theater assets.

(4) Begins to provide intelligence support to SEAD.

G–9. STEP 6. MONITORING MOVEMENT OF THE ENEMY

a. Complementary sensors are key to confirming movement of the enemy. For example, a plan may include the use of side–looking airborne radar (SLAR) and long–range surveillance units (LRSUs) to monitor the enemy's movement out of the assembly area (AA) into the NAIs and TAIs. When the number of armored vehicles moving out of the AA reaches the threshold established by the corps, LRSU teams report back to the corps tactical operations center (CTOC).

b. The G2's collection, management, and dissemination (CM&D) section directs the collection effort against the main target. Situation and target development efforts also must be focused on targets that may interfere with the aviation brigade mission; the attack helicopter operation will require SEAD.

(1) At this stage, the intelligence staff is also tasked to collect information on enemy AD targets along planned routes of ingress and egress; the staff also collects information in and beyond the planned EAs. Targets are located on enemy AD installations during this collection effort; these locations are provided to the fire support element (FSE) to update the fire support plan (FSP) that supports the attack.

(2) The FSP includes not only lethal attack on AD targets but also nonlethal (EW) attack. The G3 requests EW support from higher headquarters to engage AD targets in depth. He coordinates with the corps G2 in tasking division EW assets needed to support forward line of own troops (FLOT) penetration by jamming AD C2 nets near the FLOT. EW support is executed during planned lethal attacks. The mechanisms for accomplishing this tasking are the FSP and the EW annex, both of which are continuously updated.

G–10. STEP 7. PREPARING FOR CORPS ATTACK

The aviation brigade commander restates the mission to the corps commander 8 to 12 hours after receiving the mission. The aviation brigade warning order ideally is issued at H–72. The aviation brigade tactical CP relocates near the corps main CP shortly after the warning order is issued. The aviation brigade commander and the G2 also submit requirements for intelligence support. If the division is conducting a deep attack, the cycle is compressed. The following steps (8 and 9) assume a corps attack.

G–11. STEP 8. REFINING TEMPLATED ENEMY POSITIONS

a. About H–60, specific orders and requests are sent to corps subordinate divisions, the military intelligence (MI) brigade, adjacent corps, and echelons above corps (EAC). The corps G2 (all–source production section (ASPS) and the CM&D section) develops the requests and passes them to the MI brigade. The technical control and analysis element (TCAE) takes the prioritized collection targets and turns them into collection taskings for the sensor platforms.

b. The TCAE searchs its enemy electronic order of battle data base for the location of radar emitters for enemy AD units that can track the attack helicopters along the ingress route, EA, and egress route. The TCAE also searches its technical data base for frequencies and call signs for the C2 elements of specific AD units. This data provided tracks communications intelligence (COMINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT) for units, refining the templated positions of enemy units. This process is refined and updated within 22 to 24 hours.

G–12. STEP 9. HIGH–PAYOFF TARGET LIST

a. From H–60 to about H–24, sensors are identified to cover the corps area of interest on a more or less equal coverage basis. These sources provide an idea of the flow of the battle and possible enemy objectives or intentions. The LRSU is inserted; it positions itself to support the operation as planned. Theater and national assets are requested to provide support as needed and to cover areas beyond the range of corps organic sensor capabilities.

b. During the processing and analysis, special attention is given to targets listed on the HPTL. The collection results reflect friendly capability to detect, identify, and locate targets. The list is developed and refined based on the collection.

c. The HPTL provides the target descriptions, attack times, and attack methods; indicates battle damage assessment (BDA); and contains remarks concerning integration.

d. The aviation brigade target list is forwarded to the corps G2.

G–13. STEP 10. SIX PHASES OF CROSS–FLOT ATTACK

The aviation brigade cross–forward line of own troops (FLOT) attack is conducted in six phases: preparation, penetration, movement to the objective, actions at the objective, return, and restoration. Each phase requires extensive staff planning and coordination from corps level down.

a. Preparation.

(1) Mission analysis. Conduct of mission analysis results in the restated mission and warning order (WO).

(2) Intelligence preparation of the battlefield.

(a) The CM&D section must ensure that appropriate imagery intelligence (IMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) sensors are available throughout the attack to continuously update attacking aircraft and to provide BDA.

(b) Aviation elements are updated through intelligence reports from the CTOC to the aviation brigade tactical command post (CP), located near the corps main CP.

(c) The aviation brigade uses the corps' IPB as a starting point. The deep attack AO is the main focus for the aviation brigade S2. From the corps IPB, the aviation brigade S2 narrows the focus to address the axis of attack, ingress routes, the objective area, and egress routes. In selecting multiple routes and positions, the S2 considers primary and alternate routes, positions, and EAs. Air routes should bypass enemy units, especially AD. Terrain should afford terrain masking—for example, swampy, hilly terrain; mountains; and dense forests.

(d) For sensor planning, all sensors involved from H–hour through the return phase must be in place and functioning as planned.

(e) The movement of the enemy through the NAIs is observed at the decision point. This event triggers the aviation cross–FLOT deep attack. This sequence is depicted graphically in a DST.

(3) Task organization. Based on the mission analysis and situation, the attack helicopter commander may task–organize his force. The attack helicopter company (ATKHC) may organize its eight AH–64s Apaches into light and heavy teams. The light team (two AH–64s) may be equipped with eight Hellfire missiles, a mix of 38 Hydra–70 rockets, and 1,200 30 millimeter (mm) cannon rounds. The team designates targets for the heavy attack team and provides all–round security. The heavy attack team (four AH–64s) will equip their aircraft with a maximum load of 16 Hellfire and 1,200 30mm cannon rounds. The heavy team remotely engages targets designated by the light team.

(4) Gun–to–gun lay comparison (missile math). Building this matrix allows the staff to compare the relative combat power of an attack helicopter battalion (ATKHB) against the opposing enemy unit. For example, a former–Soviet Union (FSU) tank regiment has about 150 combat vehicles. With an operational readiness rate of 90 percent, the tank regiment would roll forward with 135 operational combat vehicles. The ATKHB will attack the tank regiment with 192 Hellfire missiles. A probability of hit of 60 percent has been determined from previous firing data. This allows a factor for defective missiles, combat losses, and combat environmental effects. The aviation brigade commander had established a 70–percent destruction goal in his end state. This process of estimation shows that a possible 115 combat vehicles would be destroyed.

(5) Command, control, and communication. Key staff officers at the division or corps main CP normally plan and execute deep operations. Key personnel—the G3, assistant G2, fire support officer (FSO), air liaison officer (ALO), and aviation brigade commander—must take part in planning and executing the operation.

(a) The aviation brigade positions a ground tactical CP; the tactical CP expedites C3 near the forward assembly areas (FAAs) of the ATKHBs. During the mission, the attack helicopter brigade commander may command and control from an airborne tactical CP (UH–60 Black Hawk).

(b) The battalion commander's location is key to his decision–making process; it also is crucial to his ability to control battalion actions as the operation unfolds. The FAA is the last face–to–face coordination point between companies of the battalion. The battalion commander can command and control from aircraft or the ground. However, when he is in an aircraft he is with the fighting force and can make accurate and timely decisions. Any cross–FLOT operation will be battle–drill and standing operating procedure (SOP) oriented. Radio listening silence can be maintained during the mission.

(c) Communication between forward–deployed aircraft and CPs is the greatest challenge to ATKHB deep operations. The fluid nature of the battlefield and high–risk nature of this operation require the attack aircraft battalion commander to be able to constantly communicate with the tactical air coordinator (TAC) to receive and relay critical combat information.

(d) Synchronization and avoidance of fratricide must produce the maximum combat power at the decisive point to defeat the enemy. Army aviation focuses on the routes, FAAs, holding areas, air control points, and battle positions (BPs) to synchronize Army airspace command and control (A2C2). Synchronization enhances the combat power of the total force by preventing duplicate efforts.

(e) The corps A2C2 element coordinates, integrates, and regulates the corps airspace. For the cross–FLOT operation, the aviation brigade commander must coordinate employment of his assets according to the A2C2 plan. To prevent engagement by friendly AD forces, the commander must exploit the existing C3 structure. He also must require his forces to adhere to directed control measures.

(f) The EA may be designated a restricted operations zone (ROZ), which is controlled by corps. The aviation brigade likely will receive a special corridor from the corps rear area to the BPs near the EA. This special corridor is large enough for the aviation brigade's air corridors. Restricted operating zones have been set up for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and Guardrail to support aviation deep operations. The battlefield coordination element (BCE) has planned an air interdiction (AI) ROZ. This zone is scheduled to be implemented after the aviation deep operation. SEAD targets are designated as airspace coordination areas to keep the aircraft from overflying probable impact areas. An airspace coordination area is established around each downed aircrew pickup point. This area protects aircrews and rescue personnel from friendly fires. The AD weapons control status in the special corridor is "weapons hold." Specific control measures will ensure that air and ground maneuver forces are synchronized.

(6) Execution matrix. An execution matrix is established to synchronize execution. It includes intelligence; aviation maneuver; fires; USAF; and C3. The matrix includes the time line in relation to the DST and cross–FLOT penetration (F–hour). It also includes such key events as identifying the enemy at the NAIs and implementing the event sequence.

(7) Assessment of new and additional priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) against current PIRs. The G2 section—ASPS and CM&D—continue the IPB. The situation is further developed. At the same time, the isolation of high–payoff targets is assessed; also collection tasks are finalized for corps and division assets.

(a) Target development continues in support of the deep attack. At about H–48, the aviation brigade tactical CP moves forward and establishes communications. The final aviation brigade order also is issued; detailed fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) follow; updates are provided.

(b) The collection plan is revised at about H–24. This revision is based on the chosen course of action and HPTL. The drive to target acquisition begins. Specific targets are focused on, and target locations are refined, that are within the tolerance of weapon systems to be used against each specific target. A matrix is developed to support coordination and execution of SEAD. The matrix also supports the deep attack of the enemy force. The corps G2 (CM&D section) reviews the matrix.

(c) The collection plan must support both target development and acquisition and situation development. Agencies must be tasked and sensors requested to support this plan. Sensors and processors are focused electronically or physically; these begin to isolate targets in time and space. The analysis effort concentrates on targets on the HPTL.

(8) Logistics. The aviation brigade requires substantial logistical base augmentation—especially in fuel and munitions—to sustain combat operations. All aviation maintenance and support functions must be tailored to support aviation deployments and operations.

(a) While in the corps rear area, the general support (GS) maintenance battalion, aviation maintenance battalion, and contact teams provide continuous support on an area basis. During the deep attack preparation phase, a portion of each support element moves forward with the aviation elements. Corps planners must coordinate the space for support elements in the division rear area.

(b) As H–hour approaches, CS and CSS elements move to their designated locations. Intelligence units position to support the deep attack. Sensors identified are on–station as the sequence begins. The aviation brigade and the FSE receive final updates to revise the SEAD plan.

(9) Attack positions. The preparation phase closes at H–hour; the ATKHBs are in their attack positions. The aircraft turns off their identification, friend or foe (IFF) transponders as they cross IFF OFF line. (This line is established by the A2C2 element after coordination with the air support operations center (ASOC) and other activities.) The aviation brigade tactical CP locates near the ground brigade main CP. This proximity enhances terrain management and ultimately the forward and rearward aerial passage of lines. AD weapons status and artillery fires (SEAD) receive final coordination and verification.

(10) Event sequence.

(a) The decision to attack is made. It is based on the enemy's projected rate of movement and the time anticipated for a synchronized response from the corps. The corps staff's final coordination and verification are based on actual time; this time then becomes the basis for the attack helicopter units crossing the line of departure or the artillery units shooting their first SEAD missions.

(b) Based on the collection plan, sensors are expected to detect the enemy in the NAIs. Decisions are made to attack according to the event sequence based on actions at the decision points. The cross–FLOT penetration time, or F–hour, also is established at this time. Mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) and frequency modulated (FM) radio are among the means of disseminating orders to execute the sequenced events. The corps commander has established checks to monitor and control units executing their sequenced tasks.

b. Penetration.

(1) An aviation cross–FLOT operation is a combined arms maneuver mission; it requires the support of all arms. All corps units involved with the battle must take part in planning and coordination to preclude fratricide. The corps must coordinate the passage points with the division to expedite the passage of lines. This operation requires a plan for a series of fires integrated into a strict time sequence. This sequence may include multiple crossing points, a ground feint, and an aerial ruse at the crossing site to divert enemy radar and attention.

(2) The fire FSP for this operation is planned in detail to assist in crossing the FLOT. The fires should be scheduled so that they begin before forces cross the FLOT and end before the lead aircraft arrives at the FLOT. (Particular attention should be paid to the effects of the fires on friendly aircraft.) Communications jamming (COMJAM) should end as aviation units leave friendly artillery range. ELINT jamming continues until the aviation unit returns.

(3) Aviation planning requires tactical maps that reflect mission graphics to include: times, routes, hazards, headings, distance, airspeed, altitudes, navigation way points, and known or templated enemy locations.

(a) Route separation considerations should include the separation of company flight paths by as much as 3 to 5 kilometers (kms). This separation improves survivability; a single threat system is thus less likely to acquire and destroy the entire attack force. A holding area short of the FLOT is planned in case the operation is delayed after attack companies depart the AA. A2C2 may require that all cross–FLOT routes be combined into one corridor.

(b) Key strengths of the AH–64 ATKHB are the speed, mobility, and capability to operate in darkness and in low visibility. All of these enhance the battalion's survivability. They also improve its prospects of maintaining stealth and surprise. Route planning—both forward and behind the FLOT—is based on terrain that limits the enemy's direct fire potential and conceals aircraft from electronic, radar, and visual acquisition. In conjunction with dead reckoning, Doppler is the key navigational aid in the AH–64. However, it must be updated periodically using known terrain points.

(4) At F–15 minutes, as the SEAD operation begins, the attack companies move forward from the FAA to identify the passage points. Aviation brigade liaison officers (LOs) coordinate the forward and rearward passage of lines. They ensure that the passage point location is correct. They also ensure that the local AD fire control status has been adjusted for the passage of friendly aircraft. The LO may even give a visual signal to the AH–64s as they pass through the FLOT; this signal provides a known point on the ground for a Doppler update.

(5) As the aviation unit prepares to cross the FLOT, the aviation brigade tactical CP receives intelligence updates. The FSE updates the SEAD plan from constant updates on the enemy AD picture. At this time, some intelligence collection shifts to the engagement area.

(6) Once past the FLOT, the attack force must execute a precise plan. Each member of the attack force must be briefed on contingencies that may arise as the tactical situation changes. Speed is essential as the AH–64s penetrate the FLOT and proceed forward to the EAs. Avoidance or rapid suppression of enemy fires and continued movement to the objective area are key to mission timing and synchronized arrival into BPs as the enemy enters the EA. The degree of separation between aircraft normally is a decision based on visibility and terrain.

(7) The speed and altitude used by attack helicopters are related to the threat, weather, and terrain. The lead company may be required to immediately suppress enemy systems that threaten the force while en route to the objective. Once out of tactical fire (TACFIRE) digital communication range, the FSO (UH–60) passes fire missions by voice FM or ultra high frequency (UHF) to the CTOC. At the CTOC, the field artillery intelligence officer (FAIO) ensures that no conflict occurs between maneuver unit movement and artillery fires passed to firing artillery units.

c. Movement to the Objective. During the movement to the objective, intelligence updates the AD picture as the aviation attack continues. AD concentrations or significant changes, as well as situation reports, are reported to the attacking units over radio relay.

(1) The light attack team reconnoiters the route holding areas and BPs. Then it will maneuver to forward BPs so that it can visually acquire and identify targets.

(2) The attack helicopters will engage targets from concealed BPs that are designated in the operation order.

(a) BPs are selected in relation to the EA from a careful map study and kill zone analysis. Mutual support, overlapping coverage, and the laser–to–target line are primary considerations. In addition, staffs must consider the sensor effectiveness and the probability of kill of the helicopter's weapons systems.

(b) In deep operations, the occupation of BPs may be difficult if they have not been reconnoitered and secured. How the AH–64 disperses within a BP is terrain–dependent. BPs have to be adjusted significantly to obtain optimum fires on targets. The BP must be secured while it is occupied. Crews are assigned sectors of responsibility for periodic air and ground sweeps.

(c) If the tactical situation allows, a portion of the force may be totally dedicated to the security mission in the objective area.

d. Actions at the Objective.

(1) Intelligence collection at the objective. As the aviation unit arrives at the objective, all sensors report current activity in the objective area.

(2) Target engagements. The engagement is best begun by using heavy team AH–64 remote fires. These fires optimize surprise, confuse the enemy, and allow the commander to better assess the target array. The light team designators may then fire autonomously; they use complementary engagement techniques to suppress enemy air defense artillery (ADA). If surprise is achieved and a target–rich environment is observed, the company commander should consider moving the heavy team forward; then he can direct all aircraft to engage autonomously to further reduce total engagement time.

(3) Fire distribution and control. Well–established target engagement techniques and procedures in which personnel have been thoroughly trained result in optimum kills in the EA with less exposure to enemy fires. When surprise is achieved, as many targets as possible should be rapidly developed in the assigned order of priority. To prevent multiple shots on the same target, each battalion task force (TF) must adhere to the fire distribution plan. The EAs should be broken down into smaller kill zones for pre–positioning the target acquisition and designation system (TADS); battalion or company boundaries should follow or cross an easily identifiable terrain features. Each company will be assigned a company kill zone; this zone will, in turn, be divided into smaller areas for each attack helicopter.

e. Return. While the attack unit engages the target, intelligence collection begins to shift to the egress route. Locations of enemy AD radars that have been illuminated during the attack will be passed to the FSE to update the SEAD plan. Any new concentrations of enemy AD will be reported to attacking units.

(1) Withdrawal from the objective. As the heavy team reports "ordnance expended," the light team provides massed rocket fires to allow the attack force to break contact with the enemy. The light force is loaded mainly with a mix of high–explosive and multipurpose submunitions and Hydra–70 rockets.

(2) Return route and rearward passage of lines. Return to and reentry through the FLOT differ mainly in the selection and use of different egress routes and the use of onboard aircraft survivability equipment (ASE). The corps must now coordinate the passage of lines by changing the AD weapons status of the ground maneuver units. ASE and IFF systems will be employed to the maximum to defeat all possible threat AD systems during the penetration of the FLOT. Immediately after recrossing the FLOT, companies assemble at designated holding areas for sequencing into the forward arming and refueling point (FARP).

(3) Battlefield damage assessment. Based on the collection plan, the BDA starts as soon as the return phase begins. Sensors obtain intelligence for the corps to estimate the enemy's combat effectiveness. They also provide probable courses of action and a window of opportunity for friendly maneuver deep fires.

f. Reconstitution and battle damage assessment. After FARP operations end and the battalion has moved out of artillery range, the attack battalion debriefing occurs. It involves not only the commander and members of the aviation brigade and group staff but also personnel from division and corps.

(1) The attack helicopters perform postflight checks. These checks determine whether aircraft need repair before they are sent from the FAA to the corps rear area. The entire battalion staff will be involved in the recovery. The battalion quickly moves back to the AA in the corps rear area where CSS can be focused on the battalion. The ATKHB will require 24 to 48 hours to prepare for another deep operation.

(2) All available sensors turn to BDA. They determine the results of the attack and the enemy commander's reaction. The combat effectiveness of the enemy must be ascertained. Thus, the corps planning staff will know the options the enemy army commander now has. The completion of the attack starts the planning cycle again; the attack and its effect on the corps commander's campaign plan must be evaluated.

Table G–1. Deep Planning Checklist

X | STEP | ACTION | WHO
| 1.a | Conducts a risk analysis to decide if the mission payoff exceeds the risk. | DOCC
| b | Focuses intelligence assets to gather essential mission data. | G2/DOCC
| c | Evaluates all deep operation assets to determine which should participate; for example, multiple launch rocket system (MLRS), US Air Force tactical air (TACAIR), aviation brigades, and ground forces. | DOCC
| d | Prepares operation orders (OPORDs), including basic task organization, so that sufficient combat power and assets are available. | G3/DOCC
| e | Prepares combat service support (CSS) plans to obtain resources for the operation. | G4/DOCC
| f | Provides airspace management and control procedures. | G3
| g | Focuses assigned intelligence assets to gather essential mission data, tasks intelligence assets from other Army or joint sources as needed and identified during intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), and identifies enemy air defense (AD) locations and dispositions. | AVN BDE
| h | Links the intelligence effort to the higher headquarters. | S2
| i | Conducts a mission analysis after receiving the OPORD from the higher headquarters. | STAFF
| j | Conducts a risk analysis. | CDR/S3
| k | Determines the task organization and requests additional or special combat forces (for example, special electronic mission aircraft (SEMA) assets for communications enhancement while in the deep area of operations). | S3
| l | Prepares OPORDs, including task organization. | S3
| m | Prepares CSS plans. | S4
| n | Plans for medical and maintenance evacuations. | S4/AMO
| o | Prepares aircraft and forces for operations. | S3
| p | Prepares a fire support plan to include suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) (for example, MLRS, TACAIR)). | FSO/S3
| q | Prepares search and rescue and downed aircrew recovery plans. | S3
| r | Positions CSS (minimal amounts) as appropriate. | S4
| s | Provides liaison officers to units affected by brigade ingress and egress routes and to higher and adjacent units as needed. | 3
| t | Prepares a SEAD plan and requests or coordinates for other joint assets to support the plan to include movement to and from the objective area. | FSO/S3/S2
| u | Determines friendly dispositions and coordinates air routes to and passage points through the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) or forward line of own troops (FLOT). | S3
| 2.a | Focuses all intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) support and executes the SEAD plan (for example MLRS, tube artillery, TACAIR). | ATKHB
| b | Observes Army airspace command and control (A2C2) control measures. | ATKHB
| c | Uses minimum–risk routes based on AD locations and enemy dispositions. | ATKHB
| 3.a | Executes contingency operations as required. | ATKHB
| b | Uses tactical air, as available, to include joint air attack team (JAAT). | ATKHB
| c | Seeks preplanned secondary targets if primary targets are unavailable. | ATKHB
| d | Executes mission–abort if the objective is compromised based on criteria previously established. | ATKHB
| 4.a | Employs preplanned minimum–risk return routes other than those used en route—A2C2. | ATKHB
| b | Executes the SEAD plan during the return from the objective area, if applicable. | ATKHB
| c | Reenters at appropriate passage points that were previously coordinated with frontline friendly forces. (Liaison elements are critical to this phase.) | ATKHB
| d | Proceeds to assembly areas. | ATKHB
| e | Debriefs all crews, forwards intelligence reports to higher headquarters. | ATKHB